

STATEMENT OF MIRAN MUMTAZ MUHAMMAD KHAN
DAULTANA, EX. CHIEF MINISTER, ON BEHALF OF
THE PREVIOUS MINISTRY.

Vol. No. IX

INDEX OF THE STATEMENT OF MIAN MUMTAZ MUHAMMAD KHAN DAULTANA,
EX. CHIEF MINISTER, PUNJAB.

C_O_N_T_E_N_T_S.

<u>PART. I</u>	<u>PAGES.</u>
INTRODUCTION...	1
Background of the Tahaffuz-i-Mabuwat Movement and the Anti-Ahmadiya Agitation.	2
<u>PART. II.</u>	
Course of the Anti- Ahmadiya Agitation- May 1952 to February 1953- and steps taken by Civil Administration to prevent the disturbances.	14
<u>SECTION. 1</u>	
Steps taken to ascertain the policy of Central Government with regard to the disturbances.	14
<u>SECTION. II.</u>	
Policy of the Punjab Government.	31
(1) Political Policy.	"
(2) Efforts in connection with the Provincial Muslim League.	34
(3) Attitude towards demands of the agitation within the competence of the Provincial Government.	37
(4) Efforts in connection with Press propaganda.	37
<u>SECTION III.</u>	
B. Administrative action in the sphere of law and order.	41
<u>SECTION IV.</u>	
Course of Events- August 1952 to February 1953 and steps taken by the Provincial Civil Authorities.	55
<u>PART. III.</u>	
Viewson Anti-Ahmaeiya Agitation and responsibility for the Disturbances.	60
(1) (a) Our views on anti- ahmadiya Movement.	60
(b) Attitude of the Punjab Government.	61
(2) The Responsibility for the disturbances.	63
<u>PART. IV.</u>	
Circumstances leading to imposition of Martial Law.	67
A- Course of actual disturbances and steps taken to meet them.	67

Part. iv.

B.	Course of Events- February 27th to March. 2nd.	69
C.	Events of March 3rd.	73
D.	Events of March 4th.	75
E.	Events of March 5th.	77
F.	Events of March 6th.	81
G.	Further analysis of the situation.	86
	Statement of March 6th.	86

PART V.SECTION. I.

Handling of the situation in the Punjab after March 6th.	90
---	----

SECTION. II

The muslim League during the Agitation.	92
---	----

PART.VI.

Adequacy of measures taken by civil authorities to prevent and deal with disturbances.	96
--	----

Verification of the statement.	100
--------------------------------	-----

IN THE HONOURABLE COURT OF INQUIRY.

IN THE MATTER OF INQUIRY INTO THE RECENT
DISTURBANCES IN THE PUNJAB LEADING TO THE PROCLAMATION
OF MARTIAL LAW IN LAHORE ON THE 6TH OF MARCH, 1953.

....

Statement of Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan Daultana,
Ex. Chief Minister, Punjab, on behalf of the previous
Ministry.

.....

INTRODUCTION. Sir,

In obedience to the directions issued by the
Honourable Court of Inquiry on the 16th of July,
1953, I, Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, Ex. Chief
Minister, Punjab, respectfully submit the
following statement on behalf of the previous
Ministry.

The previous Ministry, hereinafter referred to in
this statement as the Ministry, was installed in office
in April 1951 after the success of the Muslim
League in the general elections to the Punjab
Legislative Assembly held in March 1951. It was
composed of:-

1. Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, H.C.M.
in charge of the departments of Law & Order etc.;
2. Sufi Abdul Hamid, H.M.A. in charge of the
department of Agriculture etc;
3. Sardar Abdul Hamid Dasti, H.M.E. in charge
of the department of Education etc;
4. Ch. Muhammad Hussain Chatha, H.M.R in charge
of the department of Revenue etc.;
5. Sardar Muhammad Khan Loghari, H.M.P.W. in
charge of the departments of P.W.D.etc ;
6. Syad Ali Husain Shah Gardezi H.M.D in charge
of the department of Industries etc;
7. Mr. Fazal Elahi Piracha, H.M.R. & C, in charge
of the department of Rehabilitation and
Colonies.

On 24th of March, 1953, on the express
direction of Kh. Nazim-ud-Din, Ex.Prime Minister and
President of the Pakistan Muslim League, I, as Chief

Minister, tendered the resignation of the Ministry to H.E. the Governor of the Punjab and finally quitted the office as caretaker Ministry on 3rd April 1953. Thus the Ministry remained in office for a period of little less than two years and it is relevant to point out at the very outset that during this period not only there was no difference of opinion between myself and the members of my cabinet on the policy of the Government in relation to the Ahrar- Ahmadiya controversy and the measures adopted to maintain law and order in the province but to the contrary I as Minister in charge of law and order kept consulting them and sought their advice constantly in this matter. At every crucial stage during the course of this movement I put this matter before the whole cabinet and only such measures were adopted in this behalf as were agreed to by every member of the cabinet.

With this little foreward I will now try to state the case of the Ministry on the terms of reference including its attitude towards the Ahrar- Ahmadiya controversy, to the best of my memory and recollection and I hope in judging this statement it will be appreciated that this statement has been prepared without finding access to the relevant files and records of the Government in the absence of which I felt greatly handicapped because I could neither refresh my own memory nor check up certain facts and dates which it was necessary to incorporate in this statement for the sake of precision and accuracy.

PART. I.

BACKGROUND OF THE TAHAFUZZ-I-NABUWWAT MOVEMENT & THE ANTI- AHMADIYA AGITATION.

The doctrinal, political and historical causes of this controversy which had for more than

fifty years deeply agitated the minds of the Ulama in particular and of the non-Ahmadi Muslims in the Indo-Pak sub-continent in general, are too well known; yet, for a proper understanding of the anti-Ahmadiya movement in the form of its latest extreme manifestation, it is necessary to give a brief survey of its early history.

Anti-Ahmadiya feeling amongst the main body of the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, in so far as it expressed deep resentment and violent dismay at some of the basic doctrines of that sect, was as old as Ahmadiism itself. There were two outstanding reasons for it;

1. The doctrine of the 'last prophethood' of Hazrat Muhammad (may peace be upon him) is one of the most earnestly and passionately held beliefs and convictions of an average Muslim. Not only is deep devotion and veneration of the person of the Prophet a dominant emotional tone of our religion throughout the Islamic world, not only is the fact of his last prophethood the 'differentia' which distinguishes and marks him out as the bearer of the Final Word of God thus providing the real doctrinal basis for the truth and finality of Islam, but as a metaphysical doctrine expresses as the 'closing of the doors of revelation' it has preserved a purity and unity of faith throughout the long sacerdotal history of Islam which is one of our greatest prides and achievements. From the earliest days the very notion of 'another prophet' has been anathema to the main body of the believers and has been resisted as a challenge to the fundamental creed of Islam. Moreover, despite untold differences of approach and detail, divines of every prominent school and Islamic thought have shown absolute unanimity on the doctrine of 'Khatm-i-Nabuwat'.

a unanimity only equalled by unquestioned faith in the 'unity of Godhood' and the 'prophethood of Muhammad' (May peace be upon him) . When therefore, in 1902 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the Head of the Ahmadiya community proclaimed himself to be a prophet(NABI), inspired of God and Mamoor-min- Allah, and enjoined upon his followers that those who did not accept him as a prophet and did not subscribe to his creed were 'Kafirs', this claim was taken by the average Muslim to express an intolerable challenge to this fundamental creed. The resentment was not confined to religious thinkers or Ulema. Even a person like Allama Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, who represented all that was most progressive and vital in the new resurgence of philosophic and political thought in Islam, added his powerful voice to the general condemnation.

2. Unbearable as was the claim of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed to 'Nabuwat' from the very start, the attitude of the Ahmadis themselves did nothing to mitigate this feeling. On the other hand everything was done to aggravate it. The exclusiveness and separatism sedulously cultivated by them between themselves and the main body of Muslims, the aggressive earnestness of their proselytising zeal, their tendency to hang together and assist each other exclusively in the social, economic and political aspects of communal life, their anxiety to mark themselves out from the generality of Mussalmans even to the extent of wearing a distinctive physiognomy, their parading themselves as a 'band of select', and above all the uncompromising and spectacular manner in which they stated and acted upon some of their glaring differences from the faith and religious practices

of an average Muslim, give a further depth of bitterness to the feelings against them. The reaction of average Muslims to a sect which treated them as 'Kafirs', which offered their prayers in different mosques and which prided in a whole ritual and hierarchy of their own could not but be violently hostile. Their refusal to join the funeral prayers of even an innocent non-Ahmadi child, on the obvious implication that he, as a non-believer in the 'Nabuwat' of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was damned beyond redemption, and it was therefore futile or even impious to pray for him epitomised the provocation which such a creed would offer to other Muslims. It is also unfortunate that during the period of the struggle of the Muslims of India for their freedom, the co-operation of the Ahmadis with the British, their aloofness from the main political movement of the Muslims, and their comparative disinterest in the struggle for Pakistan did nothing to soften religious differences by the warmth of a common political comradeship.

During the pre-partition period, the movement against the Ahmadis was mainly confined to the sphere of doctrine and creed. Before the establishment of Pakistan, there was no Muslim State in India, nor could the politico-religious ideology of an Islamic State seek actualisation in the institutions of an established country, therefore political attitudes based on religious concepts were, in the main irrelevant. Even during this period anti-Ahmadi feelings did at times take political shapes, as during the Qadiani agitation of 1932 sponsored by the Ahrar, or the wide resentment expressed when Sir Zafarullah Khan

was selected to represent Muslims at the London Round Table Conference and the Executive Council of the Viceroy. But apart from being mainly irrelevant, political hostility was kept in check by other considerations. The Muslims of India were fighting a political battle on many fronts. The urgency of the struggle and the grave import of the issues involved kept other controversies in the background. Moreover, the overwhelming challenge presented by the presence of the Hindus and the Sikhs emphasised the necessity of unity and solidarity amongst all those who called themselves Muslims and who were therefore subjected to a common attack. It may however be recollected that even in the hey-day of our national struggle, when the question was raised in the Council of the All India Muslim League whether Ahmadis could be eligible for the membership of the Muslim League, which was exclusively confined to the Muslims, only the personal exercise of the enormous prestige and unchallenged influence of the Qaid-i-Azam could secure a postponement of the consideration of the issue.

With the emergence of Pakistan, after the partition of India, as a national state of the Muslims, new considerations and new emphases became relevant to the situation. Religious emotions of the Muslims had played a pre-dominant role in the establishment of Pakistan. The very conception of the two nation theory had made creed and faith relevant to the determination of nationality. Both the objective of 'freedom for the Muslims' and the ideal of 'an Islamic State' had concentrated attention and emotion on a religious ideology. Feeling of devotion and

patricism were evoked and centred on the concept of 'millat' rather than of 'watan'. It was inevitable that in such an atmosphere religious issues should gain greater significance, attention should come to be focussed on matters of faith and creed, and religious differences should begin to overstep into the political field. It may be noted that the almost complete elimination of the Hindus and Sikhs from the political life of Western Pakistan removed an important consideration which might have diverted attention to other aspects of the national problem.

After the establishment of Pakistan the religious basis and ideology of the new State was continually emphasised, in and out of season, with and without relevance, by the authoritative leaders of the country. The irreparable tragedy of the death of the great Qaid-i-Azam removed a man of vision who it seems had a clear conception of the vital necessity of forging the bonds of territorial patriotism, and of giving a social and economic content to the ideology of the new State- a conception which he stated but did not live to amplify as 'Islamic Socialism'. Un-questioned leadership of the nation died with the Qaid-i-Azam. It became increasingly difficult for those who followed, to resist the temptation of stabilising their popularity by calling to their assistance an appeal which had overwhelming emotional support of the people- namely the appeal of Islam and of the march towards an Islamic State. Unfortunately the conception was never given precise content. On the one hand this meant that no progress was made towards a determined end, thus inevitably resulting in

feelings of frustration and deprivation amongst the people. On the other hand, by surcharging the atmosphere with the vague terminology and aroma of religion, it gave prominence to subsidiary religious controversies and ritualisms which sucked sustenance from a congenial air.

The passing of the Objectives Resolutions by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was a categorical enunciation of the basis of Pakistan. It was in effect an indication of religious direction. After this, it was at no time open for any one to say that religious issues were not relevant to a political discussion of the future of the country.

All this created a receptive atmosphere for the broaching of religious controversies. A controversy which had such unanimous religious support behind it- the agitation against the Ahmadis- did not fail to take advantage of it.

From its earliest days, the Ahrar and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan of the 'Zaminder' had been prominently associated with the Anti-Ahmadi agitation, and had been the leaders of its most vigorous manifestations.

Defeated and humbled in their political opposition to the demand for Pakistan, the Ahrar had lost all political ground after the achievement of Pakistan, but it would be expected that they, like any other political party, would try to stage a come-back if an opportunity offered itself. They would have undoubtedly made such attempts after the advent of Pakistan, but for the fact that the Punjab, at the time of Partition lay bleeding, and the moment was not ripe for political activity of any sort.

But gradually after the first hardships of Pakistan were over in 1949, they began to try their undoubted talent on the public platform. They selected a religious issue out of their old armoury, and in eminent consistency with their past, they brought out the anti-Ahmadi agitation. Public speeches and general agitation was initiated. They presented their case in exclusively religious terms, but few could have escaped the suspicion that the popularity and support which they were seeking and gradually gathering would in time be diverted to political ends and more precisely to the achievement of political power.

The issue which the Ahrar had chosen to concentrate upon had many advantages. In its religious aspect, for the vast generality of the Muslims, it appeared uncontroversial and almost tautological. In the ideological atmosphere of the country few political leaders were disposed to take up issues on such slippery ground. The fact that an eminent Ahmadi, Sir Zafrullah Khan, was also the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, gave them an excellent vantage ground to make occasional sallies into a general criticism of the Government, on an issue in which on account of Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad, the refugees and the consistent threat of India, national vanity was most sensitive, and in a manner which allowed them to maintain the aspect of a purely non-political religious controversy.

Throughout 1950-51 the Ahrar steeped the country with their plausible propaganda which fell on receptive ears. Towards the end of 1950, the general elections in the Punjab presented them with an appropriate and plausible opportunity to

intensify their agitation. They embarked on a crusade to oppose every Ahmadi candidate to the Punjab Legislature, whether he was seeking election on the Muslim League or on another ticket, and when in the upshot every single Ahmadi candidate was defeated in the elections, they celebrated a day of rejoicing, congratulating the people of the Punjab on the support which they had given to them.

During 1950 and the first months of 1951 Punjab was governed under section 92-A regime. I believe that during this period, anti-Ahmadi feeling, grown more conscious, did at times take the violent form of threats and attacks on Ahmadis, both in the Punjab and in certain other provinces, notably Quetta. I have also an impression that some time in May 1950, the whole situation was reviewed at the highest level by the Punjab Government, but no particular action or definite policy was considered necessary. Details of the situation and of the policy followed would be more readily available to the Honourable Tribunal than they are to me. But it is worth noting that since a Section 92-A administration is a direct responsibility of the Central Government, the Central Government must have been fully seized of the situation and any policy then adopted must be considered as the direct policy of the Central Government and as an indication of its attitude to the problem.

Throughout 1951 the demands of the anti-Ahmadi agitation were of a diffusive and general character and the leadership of the movement was exclusively and formally in the hands of the Ahrar. They were however throughout supported in the field of publicity by the influential

Daily Zamindar, the direction of which had now fallen to Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, in succession to his father Maulana Zafar Ali Khan.

About this time, however, two tendencies became noticeable.

1. The main body of the Ulama throughout Pakistan and almost without distinction of sect or school, began to make common cause with the Ahrar on this issue. Two reasons may be advanced for this. (a) On the 17th and 18th May 1952, a Convention of Ahmadis was held in Karachi. One of its Sessions was presided over by Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who made a lengthy speech at the session. Public feeling in Karachi ran very high, a riot involving violence and incendiarism took place, and the convention was ultimately held under the protection of the Police. (Please refer to report in Dawn dated 19-5-52, annexure No.4) . As the Foreign Minister was involved in the incident, and as it was alleged that a controversial religious meeting had been held under Government protection, the atmosphere became charged with bitterness. All the Ulama came out in support of the Ahrar. (b) During this very period, the constitution of Pakistan seemed to be taking final shape. One of the most significant issues involved was the Islamic character of the constitution and the provisions by which that end was to be achieved. The leaders of the Pakistan Government had already, at the highest level, embarked on long deliberations with the Ulama. This made the Ulama prone to hold constant mutual discussions, and in due course to adopt a more and

more united and solidified front on all issues. When the May disturbances took place in an already receptive atmosphere, both the other Ulama and the Ahrar took advantage of it to come closer together and forge a common front. From almost this time, the formal leadership of the anti-Ahmadi movement took a more general character until in July 1952 a Majlis-i-Amal representing all the Ulama was formed by all Muslim Parties Convention and charged with full powers of direction. At all later stages the Ahrar argued that they were henceforth only a small part of a large leadership, and were in all ways subject to the Majlis-i-Amal. The personnel of the actual active agitators however continued to remain largely though not exclusively Ahrar.

2. About this time the anti-Ahmadi agitation crystallised in the form of three precise constitutional and political demands; (a) Khatm-i-Nabuwwat is a basic creed of the Muslims. A person who does not believe in Khatm-i-Nabuwwat i.e. in the final prophethood of Hazrat Muhammad (May peace be upon him) is not a Muslim. The Ahmadis therefore are not Muslims. In Pakistan the system of political representation is based on separate representation, which in turn is based on religion. As Ahmadis are not Muslims, they cannot vote with Muslims and must therefore be constitutionally declared a minority. (b) The people of Pakistan, being predominantly Muslims have no confidence in Sir Zafarullah Khan, an Ahmadi, as their Foreign Minister, and therefore he should be removed from his office (annexture No. 12 of Zamindar dated 15-7-52). (c) Ahmadi

officials being allegedly anti- pathetic to Muslims generally should be removed from key Government posts.

their minds already concentrated on the formulation of constitutional demands and having by this time obtained considerable success in their negotiations with the leadership of the Central Government the Ulema jumped at these demands and made them their own. In the final unanimous points presented by the assembled Ulema to the leadership of Pakistan as their minimum basic constitutional demands, the 'minority' demand had been given the fullest prominence.

PART. II.

COURSE OF THE ANTI- AHMADI AGITATION MAY 1952
TO FEBRUARY 1953 AND THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE PROVINCIAL
CIVIL AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT THE DISTURBANCES.

SECTION. 1.

STEPS TAKEN TO ASCERTAIN THE POLICY OF THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE MOVEMENT.

In the general background narrated above, it is now possible to give an account of the course of the anti- Ahmadiya movement in the Punjab from April 1951 onwards, during the period when my Ministry was in office.

During 1951, the movement did not cause anxiety. It did not present a serious threat to Law and Order, and any outbreaks of anti- Ahmadiya feeling could be effectively dealt with in their local milieu in the manner in which similar expressions of Shia- Sunni tension had always been handled. What was apparent however was that public enthusiasm, and public sympathy was gradually hardening against the Ahmadis, and behind the plausibility and appeal of this issue, Mullaism generally was gaining ground. We had been faced with a similar situation in 1950 during the course of the campaign for the general elections in the Punjab. In the preceding two years many considerations had conspired to weaken the Muslim League organisation both internally and in public estimation. In the mean time taking their stand on Mullaism and on narrow fanatical religiousity, the efficiently organised Jamaat-i-Islami had made considerable progress. Converting the general ideological atmosphere in Pakistan in their advantage and through an intensive programme of press and platform propaganda, the Jamaat seemed to denote the political situation in the Punjab. But under the leadership of the late Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan who was a man of definite and determined policies, we were able to face the

threat effectively. In the only manner legitimate in a democracy, we went to our people, placed our point of view distinctly before them, exposed the dangers and inaptitudes of the policies of the Jamaat-i-Islami and were able to overwhelm the Jamaat-i-Islami by a decisive expression of public confidence in the Muslim League at the polls. As early as in April 1952, I suggested a similar method of approach to the circumstances then prevailing in the country. In my capacity as President of the Punjab Muslim League I presented a report on the general political situation in the country to Khawaja Nazimuddin, the President of the Pakistan Muslim League (Appendix No.2). With the approval of the Governor General a summary of this report was presented as a basis for discussion to an All-Pakistan Governors and Chief Ministers' Conference held in Karachi from the 4th to the 7th of April 1952 (Appendix No.3). The report was discussed but no action was then or subsequently taken on it.

From May 1952, particularly after the Karachi disturbances on the 17th and 18th (reported in 'Dawn' dated 19-5-1952 Appendix No.4), the anti-Ahmadiya agitation rapidly increased in tempo. Widespread propaganda was carried out both on the platform and in the press, and there was no doubt that this propaganda was meeting with general and enthusiastic public support. A disturbing element of the situation was that almost every single religious figure in the country- from the recognised Ulama to the village Maulvis seemed united in a common front.

The Punjab Government was conscious of the dangers inherent in the circumstances. In a democracy the only basis of a popular Government is the support and estimation of the people. Gradually but rapidly the whole sympathy of the masses of the people was being alienated from the Government and the Muslim League and gathered in hostile hands, intent

on final power, who were in our honest view incompetent to handle the destinies of Pakistan in the context of the modern international world. The attention of the people was being concentrated on narrow sectional issues which would break the unity and solidarity of Pakistan and hold it up to the ridicule of the world. We were also aware that both the Centres of Ahmadi-ism and Ahrar were located in the Punjab and therefore the first and most direct consequences of this agitation would be borne by this province. Nor could we forget that the interests of the Punjab, already so sadly neglected and now threatened from many quarters, would suffer irreparably if the unity and solidarity of the province was torn into shreds.

From May onwards this situation was constantly under the review of the relevant officers of the Punjab Government, and was the subject of frequent discussions, both formal and informal, between them and myself.

The policy of the Punjab Government, and of the political party from which it derived popular support, was as follows:-

We were faced by a popular agitation which presented definite and distinct constitutional demands to the Government. Every day the agitation was gaining large public support. How was it to be met? We were by definition a democratic country. In a democracy it is the inalienable right of an individual, a political party, or a section of the people to present a point of view before the public and to agitate for that point of view. There are however distinct limitations to that right. The agitation must be run on constitutional lines, it must not break or threaten to break any law of the land, it must not, within the knowledge of the Government, be based on any conspiracy to overthrow the State or inspired by the external or internal enemies of Pakistan. What was the position of the

anti-Ahmadiya agitation when viewed in this context? In May 1952, and in fact subsequently throughout the year, it was ostensibly being run on constitutional lines. Personal conviction on the merits of the demands apart, the demands were of a constitutional nature and could be legitimately placed before the people. We had a shrewd suspicion that the motivation of the leaders of the movement, in all probability, went considerably beyond the demands and aimed at final capture of political power, but in a democracy every body has the perfect right to aim at political power through peaceful means, however unpleasant and injurious the prospect may appear to the persons actually in power. The manner of the presentation of the demands was legal. (It was through open propaganda carried out by public speeches and the newspapers. The declared aim of the movement was not to break the law in any way or to resort to any form of civil disobedience or violence. It was certainly the duty of the Government to see that violence of feelings aroused by the agitation did not break out into breaches of the peace,) but I shall try to show later how the Punjab Government dealt with that aspect of the situation, (The Government did not have any proof, or any reasonable grounds for the suspicion that the organisers of the agitation were secretly embarked on a conspiracy to overthrow the State by Violence, or were working in collusion with the enemies of the State- The Government was certainly aware that the main inspirers of the agitation were the Ahrar, and that the Ahrar had been openly hostile to the establishment of Pakistan in the days before Partition. But obviously no conclusion could be based on this fact alone.) Many elements who had been hostile to Pakistan were now accepted and sometimes even respected, in Pakistan. The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Unionists certainly fell in that category, the Ahmadis were similarly accused by many, a large number of the people actually in power today in Pakistan, could not be wholly absolved of that taint. I was

not aware in May 1952, and have not been made aware since, of any reasonable grounds to suppose that the Ahrar were conspiring to, or involved in a conspiracy for the purpose of overthrowing the State by violence, and were using the anti-Ahmadiya agitation as a part of that conspiracy. Moreover after May 1952, the leadership of the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat Movement was drawn from a much wider sphere, and a majority of its leadership was composed of elements whose loyalty to Pakistan had never been in doubt:

(This being the nature of the agitation, there was only one proper way of meeting it and that was to meet it politically. The party in power and the Government in power must define its attitude to the movement and its demands. With a clear and defined policy it must go to the people and convince them of the rightness of its stand-whether it was in favour of the acceptance or the rejection of the demands.) In a democracy there could be no escape from the will of the people. The very reason that we had chosen a popular form of Government for ourselves, that our rulers were people who were representatives of and responsible to the public, that we had rejected dictatorship and bureaucracy, despite their efficiencies, to a system in which it was not only sufficient to rule the people well, but it was necessary to rule them with their consent and according to their wishes, involved a final appeal in all controversial issues to the judgement of the people.

In May 1952 and subsequently, both my officers and I came to the conclusion that the situation must be handled politically and handled quickly, if the people were not to be allowed to fall into hostile hands. The situation may be summarised thus:-

- (i) Neither the demands nor the methods of the agitation were unconstitutional.

- (ii) We were aware of no illegal conspiracy which demanded coercive handling.
- (iii) The demands were on the way to gaining tremendous popular support.
- (iv) There were formidable dangers inherent in the agitation, but the only appropriate way to handle them was by gaining and retaining popular support behind the Government, based on a definite and distinct policy.

There could not be the slightest doubt that the only authority which was capable and competent to lay down such a policy was the leadership of the Pakistan Government, which was also the leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League. This was so for three patent reasons:

(i) It was only the Centre which could accept or reject the demands. The 'minority' issue was a constitutional question solely within the purview of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. The vast majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly were under the discipline of the Pakistan Government and of the Pakistan Muslim League, which really meant the same thing. No other authority was competent to give a final verdict on the issues. The case of Sir Zafrullah Khan was even clearer, because he was a member of the Central Cabinet and only the Prime Minister or his party could decide about his retention or otherwise.

It is obvious that final policy on an issue is only within the competence of the body which has the authority to decide about it.

(2) Khatam-i-Nubuwwat movement was an All-Pakistan movement dealing with all Pakistan issues. Its repercussions may be more acutely felt in one province, but it affected all provinces, and involved national issues and national policies. Therefore a decision relating to it

could only come from an authority which could lay down a policy for the whole of the country. Even on the narrower issue of law and order, it has been uniformly recognised that whenever the threat comes from a country-wide organisation and whenever repercussions all over the country are expected, the policy with respect to it is to be laid down by the Centre. For instance in 1951 when action was taken against Communists in consequence of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, the action was taken at the instance of the Centre and in accordance with their country-wide policy, even though the main strength of and threat from the Communists was located in the Punjab. Similarly all action against nation-wide organisation like the Khaksars, Labour agitators, etc. has always been decided upon and directed from the Centre. The history of all agitations and movements since 1947 in the neighbouring country of India bears out the same principle and conclusions. In the present case this was particularly relevant because the repercussions of any action taken in any particular place against the whole body of Ulema, who were now the real leadership of the movement, and on an issue of such intense emotional appeal as a religious is likely to become in our country, would have significantly affected the national policy of the Central Government.

(3) Not only was the Centre the only competent authority to lay down a policy on the present demands, but it is obvious that it would have been wholly indefensible and politically wrong if a Provincial Government had indicated its own policy without clear reference and explicit approval of the Central Government. Such a course would have involved two dangers. In the first place it might have resulted in conflicting policies being followed in different provinces, with the resultant dangers and confusion, quite apart from the political discredit that

such a state of affairs would have brought to the national party. In the second place the very action of the Provincial Government might have embarrassed and defeated the wider policies of the Central Government, might have resulted in stampeding the whole country into a situation which the Centre was either not prepared or not willing to face, and might have run the risk of being interpreted as a conscious effort to trap the Central Government into difficulties which were not of their making and for which they had other plans in view.

Consequently throughout the remaining months of the year, I made every humanly possible effort to persuade the Central Government to formulate a distinct and definite policy on which consistent political and administrative action could be based.

I may briefly summarise the course of these efforts:-

1. Soon after formal discussion with the Punjab Officers based on a note submitted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D., on the 20th of May, I went to Natiagali towards the end of June to attend meetings of the Basic Principles Committee which were being held from 29-6-1952 to 9-7-1952. I had hoped to avail myself of an opportunity of a full and detailed discussion of the whole situation with the Prime Minister who, it was my impression would attend the meetings. Unfortunately the Prime Minister did not come, but the meeting was attended by persons holding the highest authority and influence in the shaping of the policy of the then Central Government including Sirdar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Khawaja Shahab-ud-Din, Dr Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Dr. Mahmood Hussain, Mr. Fazal-ur-Rahman, Khan Abdul Qayum Khan and Mr. Nurul-Amin. I urged upon them that the political situation in the country was highly dangerous, that an immediate formulation of a clear and definite policy backed by intensive political work and firm

administrative action was absolutely essential, and that I was convinced that if this was done, the situation could be adequately handled. I was assured by both Khawaja Shahab-ud-Din who was then supposed to exercise the highest influence upon the Prime Minister, and by Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi that they would convey my views to the Prime Minister without the slightest delay and that personally they agreed with my view of the situation.

2. In July the situation in the Punjab worsened. The Punjab Government dealt with it adequately to the best of its ability, details of which are given later in this statement. Immediately after the situation was in control, I left for Karachi on the 1st of August to give the views of my Government to the Prime Minister. In the mean time the Prime Minister had held negotiations with certain prominent leaders of the Khata'wi-Nubuwat movement, and reports never subsequently contradicted had appeared in the Press indicating that the Prime Minister was favourably disposed towards the demands, and that he would give an indication of his policy in a public speech on the Independence Day (August 14th) Please refer to Appendix No. 17 Zamindar dated 4-8-1952). In a personal interview with Khwaja Nazimud-Din, I placed my detailed views before him. They were:-

- (i) That the movement is assuming dangerous proportions.
- (ii) That public sympathy is being rapidly won by the sponsors of the movement.
- (iii) That in the general deteriorating situation of the country, this is likely to denude Government of all popular support.
- (iv) That a clear definition of policy is necessary which can only be done by the Central Government.
- (v) That this should not be delayed.
- (vi) That strong action can only be based on definite policies.
- (vii) That the Provincial Government is not in a position to do anything without clear Central directions.

The Prime Minister promised to give his most earnest consideration to my representation. Subsequently a full dress Central Cabinet was called on the 7th or 8th of August which was attended by all Central Cabinet Ministers(except Sir Zafrullah Khan, who although present in Karachi did not participate in it either because no effort had been made to secure his attendance or for reasons of his own), and where all the Provincial Chief Ministers and the Governors of Sind and N.W.F.P. were present by special invitation. The agenda of the meeting entirely consisted of the policy to be adopted in connection with the Khatam-i-Nabuwat movement. The discussion lasted over very many hours, and I squarely placed the views of my Government before the Central Government. I urged as strongly as possible the necessity of a clear, definite and unequivocal policy with respect to the demands, the impossibility of giving an intelligible lead to the Muslim League or through it to the people without such a policy and the very grave dangers of vacillation. The Cabinet finally decided against this view. The final decision was on the following lines:-

- (i) It was not possible or politic at this stage to accept or reject the demands.
- (ii) Direct clash with the Ulama was to be avoided. Personal influence was to be exerted to restrain them from any extreme action and discussions in respect to the demands were to be carried on with them.
- (iii) A Government communique was to be issued to ensure that Ministers or officials of any particular sect did not abuse their official position to the advantage of that sect. (Appendix No.29). It was obvious during the discussion that this communique was aimed against Sir Zafrullah Khan and Ahmadi Officials, and was meant to appease public opinion agitated in favour of the Khatam-i-Nabuwat demands

3. Immediately after this meeting, I contacted Khawaja Shahab-ud-Din, knowing his influence on the Prime Minister. I expressed my dissatisfaction with the results of the meeting and pointed out to him the dangers of the present policy of drift. He seemed to agree with me and he promised me that he would try to persuade the Prime Minister to revise his attitude and would let me know of what he had been able to do during the course of our stay in Karachi. Unfortunately he did not contact me again, presumably on account of his failure to convert the Prime Minister to my point of view.

4. Later in the month, the Prime Minister went to the Frontier Province, and on his return, I arranged to have an interview with him at Murree on the 26th of August. Mr. Chundrigar who was then the Governor of the Punjab, was present at the interview. Mr. Chundrigar and I unitedly pressed our point of view on the Prime Minister. He gave no definite answer, but he said that he would await the return of Sirdar Abdur Rab Nishtar who had proceeded to Hajj and after consulting him would see what could be done. He also said that he intended continuing negotiations and discussions with Ulema and that he anticipated favourable results. In the meantime he hoped that the law and order situation would be kept in control and that nothing precipitous would be done.

5. I had another interview with the Prime Minister between the 3rd and the 5th of September at Karachi and again urged the same views with the same results.

6. In the beginning of October I had an interview with Sir Zafrullah Khan at Lahore. I told him that while we were doing our best with the law and order situation and apparently with considerable success, no real solution or improvement in the general political situation was possible without a clear policy. I advised

him to use his influence to see that such a policy was arrived at and announced during the forthcoming session of the Pakistan Muslim League Council at Dacca. He entirely agreed with my reading of the situation and felt sanguine that a clarification of policy may be forthcoming.

7. (The Dacca session of the Council of the Pakistan Muslim League held from 11th to 12th of October was an occasion of considerable importance, because this was the first occasion on which the final policy making body of the party in power was meeting after the martyrdom of the late Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.) At the meeting of the Working Committee immediately preceding the Council session which was to debate policy resolution, I urged that a clear decision with respect to the agitation and demands of the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat movement should be arrived at. (It was finally decided not to include any resolution even remotely connected with this issue amongst the resolutions which the Working Committee was to recommend for the consideration of the Council. It is my impression that during this period Khwaja Nazimuddin was highly gratified with the progress that he had been able to make in his deliberations with the Ulema both on the constitutional and the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat issues, and he did not apprehend any danger from the Movement.)

8. It would perhaps not be necessary to give details of further meetings with Khwaja Nazimud-Din or his colleagues on this subject. I may generally state that in every meeting with the Prime Minister after this date, and it may be assumed that we had occasions to meet at least once a month, I urged the same view with the same results. After December, 1952, however, my whole attention was devoted to the discussions of the 'Parity' issue in the Basic Principles Committee's Report and I did not raise any discussion on the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat during December and January.

9. But perhaps special significance may be given to an interview I had with Khwaja Nazimud-Din as late as 16th 17th of February 1953, It may be recalled that this was after the Majlis-Amal had given its final notice of Direct Action to the Central Government, and it was only a few days before the final discussions between the Majlis-Amal and the Central Government, the failure of which resulted in the happenings of March. I was naturally fully concerned with the situation and placed my views before the Prime Minister. His views may be summarised as follows:-

- (i) In the present international position, the demands could not be conceded.
- (ii) He was also not prepared to have a 'head on clash' with the Ulama, and therefore he could not consider rejection of the demands.
- (iii) He still had hopes in his forthcoming talks with the Ulama. In any case he had a fine 'trump card up his sleeve'. This was that if the Ulama were adamant he would propose a conference of all the divines of the Islamic world to give authoritative decision on the demands, and that he would abide by the decision so given. This 'trump card' he felt would give him time, in which the general situation in the country particularly with respect to food and the economic depression was likely to improve, thus creating a more popular atmosphere for the Government (Mr. Chathas' Note Appendix No.55). I was taken aback by this proposal as I felt that it was derogatory to the democratic sovereignty of the people of Pakistan. But Khwaja Sahib was impressed by his new expedient.

I was alone with the Prime Minister during this interview. But on the same day he had an exactly similar talk with H.E. Mr. Chundrigar, which was later confirmed on our comparing notes together.

The above resume of my deliberations with the

Central Government makes a number of points absolutely clear:-

(i) That throughout the relevant period, from July 1952 to February 1953, I made repeated efforts to get a clarification of the policy of the Central Government and the Pakistan Muslim League with respect to a clear and public acceptance or rejection of the demands. I felt that without a policy, no Government in a democratic country had the remotest chance of facing a public and a popular agitation.

(ii) That on every occasion I failed in my attempt and despite my best efforts, a policy of drift was adopted and persisted in.

(iii) That my deliberations with the Centre gave me, in effect, a clear mandate from the Centre as to what policy the Provincial Government was to pursue. It was decided that there was to be no clarification on the demands that is to say, there was to be no political action of any sort. The Centre was directly carrying on negotiations with the leaders of the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat movement, and reposed considerable hopes in them. Nothing was to be done or at least no initiative was to be taken by an Provincial Government to precipitate the situation, to endanger the negotiations, or to foul the line of approach on which the Central Government was embarked. In the meantime the day to day law and order situation was to be watched and not allowed to get out of hand.

While the Central Government failed to give any lead to the Punjab Government, to the members of the Muslim League or to the country, it gave various indications during the period from August 1952 to February 1953 which must have been interpreted by the general public, and particularly by the Ulema to foreshadow an acceptance of the demands of the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat movement. I would divide these indications into three categories:-

(i) Throughout this period the future constitution of Pakistan was on the anvil. One of the most significant issues involved was the Islamic nature of the Constitution viz, a discussion of the provisions by which the intention of the Objectives Resolution of the Constituent Assembly could be enshrined in the Constitution. On this point the Ulama of Pakistan had seized a historic opportunity to win their age old battle and forging a united front had presented various demands to the leaders of the Pakistan Government. Khwaja Nazimuddin and his colleagues had held long negotiations with the Ulama. In the final upshot it was apparent that the Ulama had carried their point on almost each single issue. The final report of the Basic Principles Committee which was not so much the work of the Committee as a record of the compromise arrived at between the Ulama and the representatives of the Central Government accepting the position that only a Muslim could be the head of the State, that a Committee of Ulama was to have a practical veto power on the work of all legislatures, and that the Directive Policy of the State was to ensure the observance of religious practices and duties.

It may be noted that many of the premises on which the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee were based were similar to the premises on which the demands of the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat were advocated, that the persons who had succeeded in the first negotiations were almost the same as the persons who were carrying on the negotiations in respect to the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat demands, that the persons who were to be negotiated with were identical in both cases. If the Ulama had won completely in December 1952, there was reasonable prospect of their winning again in February 1953.

(ii) From August 1952, the Central Government, headed by Khwaja Nazimud-Din, embarked on direct negotiations with the representatives of the Majlis-i-Amal. These negotiations were carried out almost continuously from

from August 1952 to 26th of February 1953. Full details of the occasions and dates of these meetings will doubtless be available to the Hon'ble Tribunal. From the Press reports, and public speeches and statements of the Leaders of the movement it appeared that the deliberations were held for many hours each day for several days at end, that the highest in the land met with the Ulama on terms of equal negotiators, and that the atmosphere was often of complete mutual understanding and cordiality. It may be recalled that such reports were never contradicted or brought into doubt.

(iii) The only definite step taken by the Central Government throughout this period was the Government communique issued on the 16th of August (Appendix No.29). This communique was directed against Ahmadi officials. It was a tacit admission from the highest quarters of the justice of at least one of the accusations levelled by the leaders of the Ahlatam-i-Nubuwwat movement. It was a clear concession to their point of view and could not but be interpreted in the public mind as an indication of the way the wind was blowing. It may also be mentioned that throughout this period an

honourable colleague of the Prime Minister (namely, Sir Zafarullah Khan) was being constantly subjected to the most violent and vituperative abuse. The criticism was not only confined to his religious views or the alleged abuse of his office for sectarian interests, but extended to a virulent denunciation of the foreign policy being followed by the Government of Pakistan. It is almost unprecedented in political history that a Prime Minister and his Cabinet should maintain such ascetic silence in such circumstances, without raising a finger to defend or taking the step of dismissing their colleague. The effect of this attitude on the general public can be easily imagined.

.....

PART II CONTINUED.Section II.Policy of the Punjab Government

Although the Punjab Government had failed to persuade the Central Government to come out with a bold expression of definite policy, it attempted within its own very definite limitations to deal with the situation politically.

1. Political Policy.

As President of the Provincial Muslim League, I availed of the first opportunity which presented itself, namely the session of the Council of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League held on July 26th and 27th, 1952 to define within our limitations the attitude of the Provincial Muslim League and the Punjab Government to the anti-Ahmadiya movement. It may be summarised as follows:-

(a) As Muslims, we had full and unreserved faith in the creed of 'Khatam-i-Nubuwwat', and considered it to be one of the basic doctrines of our religion.

(b) We were neither competent nor called upon to pronounce upon the religious consequences of disbelief in this creed, i.e. whether a person who did not have faith in the last prophethood of Hazrat Muhammad (May peace be upon him) ceased to be a Muslim or not.

(c) The leaders of the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat movement had presented constitutional and political demands to the Central Government based on this creed and aimed against the Ahmadis. As a Provincial organisation and a Provincial Government, we were not competent to take a decision on matters which completely fell within the purview of our parent organisation. We must therefore leave this matter to the mature and considered judgement of the Central Muslim League and the Constituent Assembly and we would abide by any decision taken by them.

(d) I gave the fullest emphasis to the view that

whatever the rights and wrongs of the demands, any agitation which gave prominence to sectarianism, or had the effect of dividing the people of Pakistan, was dangerous in the extreme and highly inopportune in our present national and international circumstances.

(e) I made it absolutely clear that whatever the final attitude that may be adopted about the demands, it was our first duty to preserve law and order in the land and that the protection of the life, property, honour and dignity of each citizen of Pakistan was not only a paramount responsibility of the State, but was the religious duty of every Mussalman. I gave clear enunciation to these views during the meetings of the Council of the Punjab Muslim League on both July 26th and July 27th. On the 26th I presented a printed report on the policies of the Punjab Muslim League to the Council and specifically dealt with this matter on pages 35-36 of it. On the 27th a resolution expressing the above views was passed by the Council by an overwhelming majority, and during the course of my speech in support of this resolution, I gave further emphasis and detail to this point of view. (Appendices: A copy of the Report presented to Punjab Muslim League Council App: No.22; Resolution passed by the Council App: No.21; Speech on the Resolution - press report App: No.23). It may be interesting to note that it was only through my personal effort and influence that I was able to obtain the support of the Council for this view. At the opening of the Council Session, the vast majority of the Council was in enthusiastic favour of a total acceptance of the demands of the Khatam-i- Nubuwwat movement, and it was generally believed that my speech on the 27th was able to bring about a remarkable and total change of feeling. This is borne out by a perusal of the Press reports of the meeting, and emphasised by the Press statement later issued by the Head of the Jamaat-i-Ahmediya (Appendix No.25).

(f) In an effort to import sanity, circumspection

and due deliberation in the discussion of the demands, I went further than this. Not only did I pointedly refer to the dangers of sectarianism, but I brought out the highly debatable nature of the actual demands from the political point of view (particularly, that of the 'minority' issue which I considered more fundamental and on which alone political discussion was relevant; the case of Sir Zafrullah

Khan being a domestic matter for the Central Cabinet); I tried to show how weighty arguments deserving of the most earnest and cold and deliberate consideration could be urged against them, and I forcefully urged against the evil of introducing emotion and bitterness in the handling and

resolving of abstract constitutional problems. I gave this lead during the course of my speech on the 27th of July (already referred to). As a consequence I faced violent hostile demonstrations by the general public. (Appendices No. 24 & 26) I pursued this effort subsequently in my public speeches delivered in various parts of the Punjab and particularly in speeches delivered at Pasrur, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala and Lahore. (Appendices Nos: 15, 32, 34 & 31 respectively). I was in Karachi on the 2nd of August (i.e. immediately after the Council session) and again on the 3rd of September, 1952 (i.e. immediately after my Hazuri Bagh speech at Lahore), and on both occasions I explained to the Prime Minister and his colleagues how effective my public speeches had been in turning hostile audiences to adopt an attitude of calmness and sympathy. I urged that my manner of approach could only be fruitful if it was followed up and confirmed by similar speeches and statements by members of the Central Government. I pointed out how the country rightly expected a lead from them and not from a provincial politician, who had no authority in the matter; and that if they made a real political effort, the very atmosphere of the country could be altered and changed. It is my complaint against the

them Central Government that not the slightest attention was paid to my pleas, and that throughout the course of the whole movement, I remained the one lone political voice in Pakistan who had made an attempt to influence the public on the merits of the demands.

2. Efforts in connection with the Provincial Muslim League.

Apart from the above statement of the political policy of the Provincial Government, I acted from time to time in my capacity as the President of the Punjab Muslim League to give directives to the members of the Muslim League. I directed them to keep aloof from active participation in the movement. This was done by the resolution passed on the 27th of July and by subsequent directives and clarifications. (Appendix No. 21).

I feel however that further light must be thrown on my difficulties in handling the situation within the Muslim League organisation.

Two facts must be clearly appreciated about the position of the Provincial Muslim League. Firstly that it is primarily a policy making body. Secondly that it is a subsidiary branch organisation of the Pakistan Muslim League, subject to its discipline in every way, and not competent to pronounce over policies which are definitely and distinctly within the purview of the parent organisation. Read in the context of the present agitation, this position had the following consequences. The Pakistan Muslim League and its leadership was the only authority which was competent to decide on the merits of the demands, i.e. whether the members of the Muslim League were to oppose them or to support them. Throughout this period, the Pakistan Muslim League was seized of this problem and was silent about it, while its leadership was embarked on deliberations and negotiations with the leaders of the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat movement. Therefore members of the Provincial Muslim League could not be given any directive

as to the views of the organisation on the merits of the demands. As a consequence, they were free to hold what views they chose, and were subject to no organisational discipline in this respect. Under the circumstances the only direction that the Provincial Muslim League could give was to enjoin restraint and caution, and to instruct its members not to participate in any prominent capacity in meetings organised by other parties. Even this direction could only be in the nature of recommendation and persuasion, because no question of disciplinary action could arise without a clear policy directive.

It may be mentioned that during these very days topmost leaders of the Muslim League organisation outside the Punjab were giving full and public expression to their anti-Ahmadi views. Round about June, Hon'ble Khan Jalaluddin Khan, a Minister of the N.W.F.P. Government, while addressing a public meeting in Abbotabad, gave passionate support to anti-Ahmadi-ism and roundly demanded the resignation of Sir Zafrullah Khan. The fact and tenor of his speech was confirmed to me by H.E. Khawaja Shahabuddin and Hon'ble Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan during my visit to Nathiagali. (June-July 1952). Later Mr. Hashim Gazder a prominent member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and a Muslim Leaguer signed in conjunction with other prominent leaders from Karachi a Press statement supporting the demands of the Khatam-i-Nabuwwat movement and demanding Sir Zafrullah Khan's dismissal. Soon after, he also gave formal notice of a resolution in support of the demands to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. (App:No.35) Neither then nor at any later stage did the **Pakistan Muslim League** call such conduct into question. On the other hand, while Khan Jalaluddin Khan remains to this day a Minister of the N.W.F.P. Government, Mr. Hashim Gazder has since the disturbances of March 1953 been elevated to the high office of Deputy Presidentship of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on the nomination of the Muslim League Assembly Party of the Constituent Assembly

I may further clear two political aspects of this situation. (i) In the view of most Muslims and Muslim Leaguers in the province, the issue of Khatam-i-Nabuwwat was a religious and not a political issue. While Leaguers were quite ready to accept the exercise of discipline in political matters, they were, as other Muslims, very sensitive in matters connected with passionately held religious beliefs and felt that politics had nothing to do with them. In the absence of a clear policy on merits on the demands, it was extremely difficult to meet this emotional resistance. (ii) The Muslim Leaguers were primarily political workers and depended for their entire position and status on the popular support of the people. At the present stage, entire popular support and backing was being mobilised and attracted by the organisers and agitators of the Khatam-i-Nabuwwat movement. The Muslim League workers, on the other hand, were deprived by the prevarication of their Central organisation, from giving any lead of their own to the public, either for or against the agitation. They were therefore being progressively isolated from the only source of their strength, the support of the masses. During this period many Muslim Leaguers came to me with this dilemma, and although they agreed with my explanation of the position, it did not help them in facing the situation in their own milieu.

It may be said however that throughout the period from August 1952 to February 1953, by and large the vast majority of the members of the Muslim League kept aloof from the agitation, despite the fact that they were not subject to any distinct discipline in the matter, and despite the fact that their own political position became increasingly difficult. The political reverse and eclipse which the Muslim Leaguers, everywhere, suffered as a consequence, is weak and dubious policy of the Pakistan Muslim League leadership.

3. Attitude towards demands of the Agitation within the competence of the Provincial Government.

It should be noted that apart from the two main demands of the Khatam-i-Nabuwwat movement addressed to the Central Government, the agitators later began to present certain subsidiary demands. They were mainly; (a) Cancellation of the lease of 'Rabwah' lands to the Ahmadi exclusively (b) Search of 'Rabwah' for concealed arms, (c) Removal of Ahmadi officials from key positions in the Government. Consideration of these demands was almost exclusively within the competence of the Provincial Government. From the beginning to end the attitude of my Government was that there could be no question of treating one section of the people differently from the rest, and that as we could see no justification in or evidence for the consideration of these demands, we could give no attention to them. This attitude in a matter completely within our power may be contrasted with the negotiations of the Central Government within their own sphere. It is further proof that the Provincial Government did nothing to give any encouragement, hopes or favours to the agitators, in so far as it lay within the power and the sphere of a local administration.

4. Efforts in connection with Press Propaganda.

The position with regard to the Press deserves special attention. It is normally not the duty of the Government to control and interfere with the propaganda carried out in the Press. Every person is free to say and write what he likes so long as he remains within the limits imposed by the law. The duty of the Government is to see that those limits are not infringed.

With relation to the Khatam-i-Nabuwwat movement, I gave the clearest instructions to the Director of Public Relations Punjab Government that if any newspaper transgressed the law, legal action was to be taken against it. The then Director of Public Relations would be able to state how I never interfered in the proper exercise of this

policy and never suggested the adoption of a soft attitude. He should also be able to give details of the actions taken and the reasons for decisions on the merits of each individual case.

In the national interest it was our further duty to use our influence in an effort to check sectarian propaganda which was likely to embitter the mutual relationship of the citizens of Pakistan. Consequently I made a personal effort to tackle the Press, although the situation was not free from difficulty. In our country it is the natural tendency of the Press to go with the wind, for purposes of increasing their own circulation, and unfortunately with respect to the Khatam-i-Nabuwat agitation, there was no doubt as to which way the wind was blowing.

However in July 1952 I felt that a personal approach was called for. Both through the Director of Public Relations and personally, I tackled the prominent papers amenable to our influence, which mainly extended to the pro-Muslim League press. I could not of course face them with an authoritative and definite policy, but I gave them my own views of the situation and pointed out to them the dangers inherent in any explosion of sectarianism. I achieved considerable success because the editors of the dailies 'Ehsan', 'Afaaq' and 'Maghribi Pakistan' agreed to abide by my suggestion. Ever since that day they blacked out all sectarian propaganda and maintained a complete silence on the Khatam-i-Nabuwat controversy.

It should be mentioned that the position with regard to press propaganda particularly after July 1952 was not very alarming. As far as the influential daily press of Lahore was concerned, the Pakistan Times, the Imroze, the Afaaq, the Ehsan, the Maghribi Pakistan and the Nawa-i-Waqt, were giving no help to the movement and practically blacking out the subject. The Civil & Military Gazette and the Alfazal were strongly opposing the demands and the movement. The Jammāt-i-Islami organs, namely, the Tasneem and Kausar

expressed their support for the demands, but emphasised that the demands should not be concentrated upon as an independent item of the objective, but that the problem should be considered in the context of the enforcement of Islamic Constitution. They were in fact not in support of the present agitation, but urged a wider movement for the establishment of Islamic Constitution. 'Azad', the avowed organ of the Ahrar, carried out vigorous propaganda for its party, but had a limited circulation and influence.

The case of the 'Zamindar' remained. The influential paper with a very large circulation continued throughout this period to give great prominence to the movement, writing articles agitating vigorously in its favour, but was generally careful to mention the need for constitutionalism and respecting law and order. Repeated efforts were made by me and the Director of Public Relations to tone down the partisan and sectional tenor of the paper, but without much effect. It was obvious, however, that the 'Zamindar' was in a different situation than the other three papers which had readily responded to my appeal. The 'Zamindar' had been from the earliest days the main spokesman of the anti-Ahmadi agitation, and was now its chief organ. Its very wide circulation derived its main strength from this popular policy, and both Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Akhtar Ali Khan were the recognised leaders of the anti-Ahmadi agitation. There could have been no doubt that the loyalty of the 'Zamindar' to the Khataam-i-Nubuwwat movement was greater than its loyalty to the Muslim League. Moreover it must be borne in mind that throughout this period the 'Zamindar' and its proprietor, Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, were on the most cordial terms with the Central Government and were the recipients of various distinctions and favours conferred by it. In October 1952, the editor of this newspaper was included by the

Central Government in the goodwill mission of newspapers editors of Pakistan to visit Indonesia. It is true that he did not eventually join the delegation, because Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan did not spare him. But the regard that the Central Government had for this newspaper and its policy was amply indicated by this move. A special quota of newsprint worth Rs. 50,000/- was allocated to the 'Zamindar' in February 1953. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan was through out one of the most important negotiators on behalf of the Khatam-i-Nubuwwat movement with Khawaja Nazimuddin and his Cabinet and on 23-2-53 the Prime Minister was reported to have sent a message to Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan on the telephone at Bahawalpur soliciting him to come to Karachi to participate in his negotiations with the Ulama which were in progress at that item. It is said, which fact can be confirmed either from Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan or from the Ex-Prime Minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin, that in response to this call, the former told the Prime Minister that he could reach Karachi only if the Governor-General's Viceroy was sent to carry him there. In February 1953, long after the Majlis-i-Amal had delivered its ultimatum to the Central Government, Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan was selected by the Central Government to go on a newspapers editors' mission to Holland. It is an irony of fate that this invitation was received by Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan in the Central Jail of Lahore, where he had been lodged on the 2nd of March, 1953 under the orders of the Punjab Government. Throughout this period, therefore, the influence that the Central Government could have exerted on the 'Zamindar' was much more likely to be effective than any persuasion of the Provincial Government.

SECTION III.

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN THE SPHERE OF
LAW AND ORDER.

B. Having dealt with the political aspect of the situation I would now like to give a brief general survey of the law and order position in the province as it developed from May 1952 to January 1953.

Ever since May, the tempo of the movement had been on the increase both on the platform and in the press. General public enthusiasm was rapidly gathering round the agitators, and no voice was being raised in any quarter to stem the tide of feelings. Reports of growing tension were received from the districts. At about the same time, the Ahmadis began to organise public meetings to explain their views in a natural desire to defend themselves. Acrimony between the press spokesman of the Ahrar and the Ahmadis respectively was also assuming considerable virulence. There appeared to be a distinct possibility of clashes between the organisers and supporters of rival AHRAR and Ahmadi meetings.

Apprehending growing danger to the peace in the province, the Punjab Government earnestly considered the possibilities of suitable action. A detailed report was obtained from the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, C.I.D. on the 20th of May. Based on this report and on my personal knowledge of the situation, consultations were held between the officers finally responsible for the law and order position in the Punjab and myself. The general line of policy decided upon may be

detailed below.

1. It was our considered opinion that the only really effective manner of tackling the situation was on the political level and by the Central Government. The efforts made by us to secure action in that direction have already been detailed above.

2. Clearest instructions were given that each breach of the peace or actual violation of law was to be dealt with severely. This included all speeches or statements which were actionable at law, all press articles or comments which were similarly actionable, and all attempts at violence or incitement to violence etc.

As far as I am aware this policy was never varied from. Details of actual action so taken could be made available by the Home Secretary, the Inspector-General of Police and the Director Public Relations.

3. The note submitted by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, C.I.D. on May 20th (already referred to above) had suggested a number of alternative actions that could be taken against the Ahrar. As pointed out by him, some of the alternatives suggested which involved wholesale punitive action against the Ahrar on an All Pakistan basis, depended on national policy and therefore needed Central Government's consideration and instructions. But within its own sphere the Punjab Government decided to take immediate action.

4. On the 4th of June, 1952 I convened a meeting of the Home Secretary, Inspector-General of Police, and Deputy Inspector-General

of Police, C.I.D. in which it was decided to issue a directive to all district Magistrates banning public meetings of the Ahrar and Ahmadis. This order was issued on 5th June 1952 and required the District Magistrates to take action under section 144 Cr.P.C. in this behalf. As it was later felt that the Ahrar might take advantage of the immunity afforded by mosques and hold their meetings there, a signal was issued to all the District Magistrates on the 18th June, 1952 detailing the action that they should take in case the Ahrar had recourse to this stratagem for evading the operation of their order. (Reference to Appendix No.5 may also be made in this behalf).

5. One of the directions given to the district officials was that they were to avoid a clash with the general Muslim public, and their efforts should be to isolate Ahrar leaders and prominent agitators from the general public and to take firm action against them.

The ban imposed on public meetings was violated in certain places by Ahrar leaders. This was followed by the arrest of prominent Ahrar leaders such as Sh. Hissamuddin, Master Taj Din and a score of other Ahrar workers in the province.

Two immediate developments followed this action of Government:

(a) As soon as the ban under section 144 Cr.P.C. was applied to public meetings, the organisers of the movement adopted the stratagem of organising their meetings and

carrying on their agitation in the mosques, as was apprehended earlier by Government. Daily sermons and particularly the Jumma Khutbas in almost every single mosque in the province became occasions of the anti-Ahmadiya campaign. The audiences in mosques increased beyond all previous record. Whenever action was taken against the Khateebis, Ulama or other speakers addressing the congregations, the situation was exploited by the propaganda that the Punjab Government had imposed restrictions upon congregations in mosques which, it was criticised, had never been done even by the British rulers during their 200 year rule in the sub-continent. There was a reasonable apprehension that if the agitation was given the form of a pretext against the violation of 'the sanctity of mosques', we would have to face a popular storm, which would alienate the sympathy of the main mass of the Muslim population.

Consequently Government took a number of steps to avoid this eventuality. Through the press and public statements, efforts were made to remove the impression that any interference was ever countenanced in the normal functioning of mosques (Please see my report to Council) Home Secretary's clarification of the imposition of section 144 in press statement:

Appendix No.6 in Dawn dated 2-7-52 and

Appendix No.11- D.C. Lahore's conference with

Ulema reported in Dawn dated 14-7-52). A

special meeting of high officials and district officers concerned was convened by the Chief Secretary on the 5th of July 1952 at Lahore which clarified Government policy and decided

upon suitable steps to remove this impression
(Appendix "c.5: proceedings of the meeting).

~~these~~ efforts? However, were not wholly
successful and there was a palpable dis-
satisfaction in the public mind at what was
considered to be 'interference with mosques'.

(b) The reaction of prompt Government
action involving the arrest of their leaders
had, however, a distinctly sobering effect on
the Ahrar. One of the immediate defensive
action they took was to make an attempt to
give a more representative character to the
Khatm-i-Nabuwwat movement and to relegate
themselves comparatively into the background.
On the invitation of the Majlis-i- Ahrar, an
All- Parties Convention was held in Lahore on
the 13th of July 1952 which was attended by
representative Ulama of all schools of
religious thought. The demands of the
movement were given precision and their
constitutional nature was stressed. A
Majlis-i- Amal was formed for devising ways
and means for the acceptance of these demands
and two representatives from each of the
following bodies of non- Ahrar Ulama were
nominated to it:-

1. Ahl-i-Sunnat Wal Jama't.
2. Adara-i- Haqqiq-i- Sheqa.
3. Jameat-ul-Mashaikh.
4. Hizbulahnaf.
5. Jameat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan.
6. Jameat-i-Ulema- i-Islam.
7. Jameat-i-Ahl-i-Hadees.

Similarly in the delegation of 11 Ulama
of the Punjab who were nominated to join the
deliberations of the proposed All- Pakistan
Convention of Ulama, excepting two nominees
of the Ahrar, others belonged to non-Ahrar
bodies, namely, Abul Hasnat, Maulana

Syed Muhammad Ahmad, Maulana Daoud Ghaznavi, Maulana Baha-ul-Haq, Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi, Maulana Abdul Haleem, Maulana Ghulam Muhammad Tarrannam, Maulana Hafiz Kafait Hussain and Maulana Matteeh-ul-Haq. (For detailed proceedings of the All Muslim Parties' Convention please refer to Zamindar dated 15-7-52: Appendix No.12).

The general effort of the Ahrar was to give a wide national ambit to the Ahlat-i-Nabuwat movement and to escape the consequence of repressive action exclusively directed against them. Simultaneously, stress began to be laid on seeking a solution of the issues involved through negotiations with the Central Government. Probably at the instance of the Ahrar and other Ulama, Maulana Suleman Nadwi, who on the demise of Allama Shabir Ahmad Usmani had come to occupy the position of the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Pakistan, asked for an exclusive interview with me at Mathiagali, where we were both attending the meetings of the Basic Principles Committee, on or about the 6th of July. During this interview, while protesting against the alleged imposition of a ban on congregational meetings in mosques, he informed me that the Ulama had already opened negotiations with the Honourable Prime Minister and other members of the Central Cabinet for the acceptance of these demands and that if the Punjab Government took any precipitate action it might spoil the chances of an amicable settlement of a delicate and ticklish national problem.

On my return from Mathiagali, a

newspaper reporter brought a request to me from the Ahrar leaders still out of jail, about the 13th of July, asking me for an interview and apprising me of their anxiety not to come into conflict with law. As I did not consider it appropriate to act on the information and request brought by an individual, I instructed the Director of Public Relations to formally ascertain the facts from responsible Ahrar leaders and let me know about them. I was informed that the Ahrar leaders were anxious to assure me that they only wished to carry on the movement in a strictly constitutional manner and did not wish to come into conflict with law at any stage of their movement. On this assurance I agreed to meet the Ahrar leaders. The meeting was held in my office in the Secretariat on or about the 19th of July and at this conference it was agreed that Jama'at-i-Ahrar will issue a public statement giving an assurance not to resort to violence or lawlessness or in any manner commit any breach of law, and that they would help the Government in maintaining law and order in the province. (Appendix No.52. Home Secretary's note). On my part I agreed that if such a statement was issued the Government would consider sympathetically the question of lifting restrictions on their meetings under section 144 Cr.P.C. and releasing certain Ahrar leaders who were not accused of violence or preaching violence.

The Majlis-i-Ahrar issued their promised statement on the 19th July which appeared in

the Press on 20th July 1952 (see a cutting from the Daily Afaaq dated 21-7-52 attached with the statement as Appendix No. 14). It was particularly emphasised by the Jamaat-i-Ahrar in the statement that not only they would henceforth co-operate with the Government in maintaining law and order in the Province, but that along with their efforts for the acceptance of their demands, they would emphasise the duty of the Pakistan Government and the responsibility of the general body of the Muslims to protect the life, property and honour of every citizen of the State irrespective of his creed, sect or faith.

Two days later, on the 21st July, 1952 I issued a Press statement welcoming the reorientation of the Ahrar policy on this controversy and announced that in view of it the restrictions imposed under section 144 Cr. P.C. on their meetings were being withdrawn (Cutting from the Dawn dated the 22nd July 1952 which contains my statement is attached with the statement as Appendix No. 17).

A proper understanding of this decision of the Punjab Government requires an appreciation of the nature of the administrative action taken by the Government against the Ahrar during the course of June and July 1952. We were not then concerned with the merits of the demands presented by the agitators, nor was it our purpose to take widespread preventive action to stop the agitation. Both these steps would have depended on the policy of the Central Government and it may be recollected

that it was precisely at this moment that I began my long series of efforts to get a clarification of Central policy. Our aim was a strictly limited one. It was to prevent the apprehension of violent clashes in rival public meetings and to avoid acts of violence and open breaches of the peace. The method of imposing section 144 was a method of limited efficacy and could not be continued over an indefinite period of time. Moreover the problem of meetings in mosques and action taken in regard to them would in time have created a much wider agitation, attraction the whole mass of the Muslim population and would have caught the Government on a particularly slippery wicket.

The incident of the police firing which had to be resorted to in Multan on the 19th of July against the riotous attack made by a mob on the Kup Police Station, not only sobered the leaders of the movement by convincing them that the Government would have to use all methods to control the law and order situation, it also brought the realisation to Government that punitive action would have to be coupled with political efforts and a direct approach to the people to sober them into a consciousness of their civil responsibilities.

Under these circumstances, when I was presented with a reasonable opportunity of achieving the limited object of maintaining law and order in the province, I think, I took the right decision in easing the tension and in accepting the unqualified assurance publicly given to me by the Ahrar leaders.

The rightness of the decision is proved by the sequel. From August 1952 onwards, as far as I am aware, no serious incident of violent clashes, attacks on Ahmadis, breach of the law or disturbances of the peace, took place in the province right up to the beginning of the Direct Action Movement in February - March 1953. The Ahrar did not go back on the assurance which they had given me in July 1952. In confirmation of my view it may be relevant to study the fortnightly reports submitted by Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners with respect to the general situation in their districts from September 1952 to January 1953. I think the impression would be gathered that while the usual propaganda continued, the tension had abated, the movement was even on the decline, and that nowhere was the situation considered to be alarming. I may further point out that from August 1952 onwards the main emphasis of the leaders of the Khatm-i-Nabuwwat shifted to lengthy negotiations with the Central Government and the policy and methods of dealing with the agitation and the demands came to rest exclusively within the pruvew of the Central Government headed by Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din.

I may be allowed at this stage to summarise the considerations, already implicit in the earlier parts of my statement, which, in my view, completely justify the measures taken by the Punjab Government to meet the situation as it existed in the last six months of 1952, and which did not permit of giving the preventive action taken a wider

ambit. These considerations may be tabulated in the following five points:-

1. In my opinion the only way to meet the threat was by weaning away the sympathies of the public from the agitation. In the free and democratic country a popular movement cannot be suppressed by force alone. The minds of the people must be educated, their hearts must be won. The right and correct step would have been to define the policy of the Government with respect to the agitation and its demands, and to win the support of the people behind that policy. This could have been done by the Central Government alone and despite my best and prolonged efforts, I failed to persuade them to do so.

2. I would in any case have been justified in taking preventive action against the Ahrar and other leaders of the movement if I had reasonable proof of either of the following possibilities :-

- ✓ (a) that the methods of the agitation were unconstitutional,
- (b) that the movement was aimed at the overthrow of the State,
- (c) that the Ahrar or others concerned were embarked on an anti-Pakistan conspiracy or were working in collusion with the enemies of the State,
- (d) that the movement aimed at employing illegal methods of violence for the achievement of its objectives.

It is my submission that I had reasons to believe none of these things, and had no proof or plausible suspicion in either of these directions with respect to the organisers of the *Khatm-i-Nabuwwat* movement.

3. The demands of the *Khatm-i-Nabuwwat* movement were addressed to the Central Government.

The movement had an All-Pakistan ambit, whatever its emphasis in a particular province. If preventive action against such a movement and its leaders was to be considered, it could only have been considered at an All-Pakistan level and by the Central Government. I have already shown how this had been the invariable practice adopted by the Pakistan Government and by other Governments in similar situations, and no other practice is possible.

4. It may still be urged that as the main danger was to the Punjab, unilateral independent preventive action should nevertheless have been taken by us. I have pointed out that such unilateral action, apart from being unprecedented, might have involved conflict in provincial policies inter se and contradiction with a national policy envisaged by the Centre with the resultant confusion and dangers.

I further maintain that after August 1952 and right up to February 27th, 1953 it was not open to the Punjab Government to take such an action. During this period such action would have been contrary to the policy and directions of the Central Government. In the meeting of the Central Cabinet held in August, the whole issue decided not to take any action but to pin hopes on negotiations with the agitators. This attitude was continually maintained until the end of February, 1953. Moreover throughout this period the Central Government representatives including the Prime Minister were holding earnest deliberations and negotiations with the leaders of the movement, which continued right up to the last days of

February. In these circumstances if a unilateral action taken without Central guidance had resulted in a precipitation of crisis, the Provincial Government may well have been held guilty of stabbing the Central Government in the back, or pushing it uncereemoniously into the dark. The duty of the Provincial Government to maintain law and order remained. I submit that the Punjab Government was able to fulfil this duty adequately right up to the end of February 1953. One further duty fell on the Provincial Government. It was to give due warning to the Central Government of the gravity of the situation. I have already shown that in this respect at least, I, as representing the Provincial Government, fully discharged my duty.

While judging this aspect of the case a special note may be made of this fact that during all this period, or in fact beginning from some time in 1950 the situation of law and order as arising out of this controversy and the dangerous trend which this movement was taking progressively was being regularly conveyed to the Central Government by means of fortnightly reports submitted to it on the situation of law and order in the province. Besides these fortnightly reports which were prepared by the officials of the Punjab Government, the Central Government had a branch of the Central Intelligence Bureau working directly under the Central Government and it can be safely presumed that besides our reports, the Centre was being kept informed by their own Intelligence Department.

about the situation of law and order arising out of this movement independently and directly.

5. I may be permitted to add one final word to this argument. Today we are embarked on an ex-post-facto analysis of the past. We know that in March 1953 unprecedented disturbances on a very wide scale actually broke out in the Punjab. But we must not permit the enormity of what happened later to cloud a reconstruction of the situation as it appeared to prevail in the last six months of 1952. The position as it then appeared to me was this. The outbreak of June and July 1952 had been controlled. The tempo of the movement had not since shown any alarming increase. There were no breaches of the peace, no significant outbreaks of violence or of lawlessness. The Centre was fully seized of the position and was embarked on long negotiations with the leaders of the agitation. Other problems seemed to be occupying the public mind with greater urgency - the problem of food, the problems connected with the new Constitution, the problems of economic depression. The situation was alarming, but not necessarily alarming in the direction of the Khatm-i-Nabuwwat movement. In these circumstances, and consistent with the attitude of the Central Government, I am still convinced that I had no alternative but to act as I acted.

Section IV.Course of Events - August 1952 - February 1953
and steps taken by the Provincial Civil Authorities.

The main events and trends of the movement as they took shape in the months from August 1952 to February 1953 may now be summarised:-

Throughout this period there was no general flare-up in the Punjab nor were there any indications of alarming symptoms. Propaganda and agitation in support of the demands was carried on with vigour, but no noticeable 'law and order' incidents, breaches of the peace, or instances of violence against the Ahmadis took place. I believe that this would be borne out by a perusal of the fortnightly reports submitted by the district officials. I do not recollect that any district officer, during this period, drew the attention of the Government towards a deterioration of the situation which called for special handling.

Three reasons may be assigned for this development:

1. Public attention was more deeply engrossed with other problems, particularly the difficulties of the food situation, the stresses and strains of the economic depression, and the significance, particularly for the Punjab, of the controversy over the 'parity' issue in the Constitution. 2. Events of June and July 1952 had sobered the leadership of the movement, particularly the Ahrar, who were now more cautious in their approach. 3. Concentration of the leaders on negotiations with the Centre, which appeared to be on the point of yielding fruit.

Talks between the Central leadership and representatives of the Majlis-i-Amal had gone on since the beginning of August 1952. Further talks were held by the Majlis-i-Amal representatives with the Central leaders in Karachi in November 1952. According to a press report, Maulana ~~Abul~~ Hasnat Muhammad Ahmad explained to a Majlis-i-Amal meeting in Lahore on November 25, 1952

the results of his talks with members of the Central Government. It was then decided that an All-Pakistan Convention should be held in Karachi on January 16th to 18th 1953 under the auspices of the Majlis-i-Amal. During this conference further talks were held with the Central leaders. As a result of the deliberations of this conference a Central Council of Action was formed. On 23rd January 1953, the members of this Council met the Hon'ble Prime Minister at his residence and delivered to him a notice of direct action in case their demands for declaring the Ahmadis a non-Muslim community, the removal of Sir Zafrullah Khan from the office of the Foreign Minister and the removal of the Ahmadis from key posts in the Central Services, were not accepted within a month. At a public meeting outside Mochi Gate Lahore on February 1st, 1953, Master Taj Din and Maulana Abul Hasnat Mohammad Ahmad gave this information to the public. It was announced that the Direct Action to be taken in the event of the non-acceptance of the demands was to be decided upon a meeting of the Majlis-i-Amal to be held in Karachi on February 22nd, 1953.

It may be mentioned that the Punjab Government was not informed by the Central Government of the trends and conclusions of these negotiations at any state, nor was the Punjab Government or any of its representatives in any formal or informal contact with the leaders of the agitation.

After the announcement of the Direct Action ultimatum, the Punjab Government was progressively concerned with the situation. It would be noted, however, that no incidents whatever took place in the Punjab during the month of February which might have drawn pointed reference to a special urgency in the position.

Attempts made by the Punjab Government to obtain a clarification of the situation may be narrated below: (1). A Governors' Conference was being held at Dacca under the presidency of His Excellency the

Goverhör-General on the 11th to the 13th of February, 1953, In an effort to take advantage of that occasion, a full discussion bearing on the urgency of the situation, and the necessity of obtaining a clear guidance of policy from the Centre, took place between the Punjab Governor and myself. I believe a suggestion was also made on our behalf that this item should be included on the agenda of the Governors' Conference. I am not aware of the details of what took place at Dacca.

(a). On the 16th of February Khwaja Nazimuddin arrived in Lahore. In popular support of the demands a complete hartal was observed in the city. I have already recounted the details of his talk with His Excellency the Governor and myself on that occasion (Page 26 above)

(3) The Punjab Government discussed the situation at a formal level on receipt of a copy of the notice of the Direct Action ultimatum, which was forwarded to us by the Central Government without comments. A formal note was sent on the 21st of February, 1953, to the Central Government setting out the views and reactions of the Punjab Government.

(4) Since the start of the negotiations between the Central Government and the Majlis-i-Mal, I had had no official contact with any section of the leaders of the movement. Sometime in February, however, the Inspector-General of Police had an interview with Master Taj Din. Subsequently in consultation with the Inspector-General of Police, I had a short meeting with Master Taj Din on the 11th of February. On that occasion I had no discussion with him because he felt that Maulana Abul Hasanat Mohammad Ahmad should also be present. Subsequently Messrs Taj Din, Abul Hasnat Mohammad Ahmad and Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan came to see me on the 13th of February. They stayed with me for under an hour. I pointed out to them the dangers of the course they were following and of the certainty that if law and order was disturbed, very serious action would be taken. As far as the merits of the demands were

concerned, I told them that they had nothing to do with me and could only be pronounced upon by the Centre. They said that there was no likelihood of their taking law and order in their own hand and that in the course of the forthcoming talks that they were going to have with Khawaja Nazimuddin and the Central leaders, they were sure that a decision favourable to their point of view would be arrived at or at least a way out would be found.

Nothing of note happened in the Punjab between Khwaja Nazimuddin's visit on the 16th and the 26th of February. ✓
Ahrar leaders met Khwaja Nazimuddin in Lahore and later formal negotiations opened between the Central Government and the Majlis-i-Amal at Karachi on the 20th of February, 1953. On February 23rd Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan stated in Lahore that while he was in Bahawalpur, the Prime Minister had sent him a message on the telephone that he should reach Karachi to join the talks. The talks he added were continuing. The Majlis-i-Amal postponed its final meeting to discuss the question of launching Direct Action from the 22nd to the 26th of February, 1953.

On the 25th of February 1953 I received an urgent message from Khawaja Nazimuddin stating that the position was critical and that I should reach Karachi on the afternoon of the 26th to take part in a high level conference in ✓ connection with the threat of Direct Action. There and then, and in two later phone calls during the 25th and 26th morning, the last in the presence of His Excellency the Governor-General, who was then in Lahore and the Punjab Government would support any decision taken by the Centre, but that in my considered view the Government should remain firm and not yield to a threat of violence or civil disobedience. I held consultations with my Cabinet and my officials on the 25th and 26th and they unanimously agreed with the view I had expressed to the Prime Minister. On the 26th morning, Mr. Muhammad Hussain, then the Revenue Minister in the

Punjab, the Inspector-General of Police and the Home Secretary left for Karachi by plane to represent the provincial point of view at the high level conference, scheduled to be held later in the day at Karachi. The course of the discussion in the Karachi conference is instructive. The report of the proceedings of the Conference prepared and signed by Ch. Muhammad Hussain is attached with this statement as Appendix No. 55.

The following comments are suggested by a study of the course of the Karachi talks:-

1. To the very last moment, Khwaja Nazimuddin was reluctant to take any action. He was still considering methods of gaining time on the line of the 'Ijmaa-i-Ummat' etc. When the ultimate decision to resist the Direct Action movement was arrived at, it was forced upon the Central Government by the final and irrevocable challenge of the Majlis-i-Amal to launch civil disobedience within the next few hours, leaving them with no alternative course of action. This is confirmed by a later speech of Khwaja Nazimuddin. (Appendix No. 50).
2. Even at this late stage, the Central Government fought shy of taking the people into their confidence and did not pronounce a clear cut policy in respect to the demands of the movement to the public. The situation was to be faced on a purely 'law and order' level. ✓
3. The representatives of the Punjab Government fully emphasised the acute gravity of the situation. Khwaja Nazimuddin, however, was of the view that as the Ulema were divided, and as no repercussions were likely in East Bengal, the situation was not acute.
4. The Punjab Government stood for strong action, as in their view surrender to a threat of civil disobedience would mean the end of the Government. The Central Government's decision to face the movement was taken with the full approval and support of the Punjab Government. This point is also confirmed by the later speech of Khwaja Nazimuddin.

VIEWS ON ANTI-AHMADI AGITATION &
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISTURBANCES.

In the light of the data presented in Part I & Part II of my statement, I am now in a position to summarise my answer to two questions contained in the questionnaire of the Hon'ble Tribunal.

1. 1. Our views on the Anti-Ahmadi agitation.

(a) The agitation took root from a deep and profound religious feeling shared by the vast majority of the Muslim people. It was based on an unquestioned basic creed of Islam. The agitation had a long continuous history behind it and was very largely accentuated by the exclusive, separatist, uncompromising and fanatical tendencies of the Ahmadis manifested in all spheres of life, but particularly obnoxious to the generality of Muslims in the matter of creed.

The religio-political ideology of Pakistan emphasised by all its leaders and accepted in the basic provisions of its draft constitution, created a fertile and persuasive atmosphere for the import of religious considerations and points of view in the normal sphere of politics.

Taking advantage of this situation, the Ahrar, probably to recover from the political discredit in which they had fallen and possibly to capture final political power revived the Anti-Ahmadi agitation in Pakistan, giving it the precise shape of concrete constitutional demands. In a short time the agitation won the active or passive sympathy of the great mass of the Muslim population, united the Ulema in a common stand, and emerged as a vast popular mass movement.

The Khatam-i-Nabuwwat was not a new

movement, it was the revived of an old movement in a new and a more favourable milieu. The Khatam-i-Nabuwwat movement might have been initiated with political motives but when it came to be dealt with, it represented a near-unanimous demand of the people.

(b) The attitude of the Punjab Government to the actual demands of the agitation may be stated under the following heads:-

Religious: We had complete and unreserved faith in the creed of Khatam-i-Nabuwwat, but were neither qualified nor called upon to pronounce on the religious effects of disbelief in it. In our own personal faith however it had the sacredness of a fundamental tenet of Islam.

Political: A final decision on the merits and demerits of the constitutional demands viz (i) the minority issue and (ii) the removal of Sir Zafrullah Khan was outside our competence, and could only be decided upon an authoritative political basis by the Central leadership of the Pakistan Government and the Pakistan Muslim League. We would have certainly been bound to abide by the verdict of our parent and superior authorities.

We had however the following reactions to the agitations:-

(i) That any movement which aroused sectarian bitterness in Pakistan was fraught with the gravest dangers to the future of the State. ✓

(ii) That the movement was highly inopportune, because it tended to inflame the public on a domestic issue of no immediate urgency, when the first need of the country was to face its internal and external dangers with unity and solidarity. ✓

(iii) That viewed in the present day international context, and discussed on a purely political level, the demands, particularly the 'minority' issue, was highly debatable and very weighty political and practical arguments could be advanced against it. It therefore deserved calm and deliberate consideration in an atmosphere free from bitterness, acrimony or agitational sharpness.

(iv) The agitation presented a grave challenge to the Muslim League. By diverting overwhelming popular support to hostile organisations, it was cutting the ground from under the feet of the national party, leaving its workers confused, demoralised and isolated. The only way to face the situation was to come out holdly with a definite and clear policy, and to rally the people behind that policy. To achieve this, a distinct lead from the Centre was necessary.

Administration: Irrespective of the merits of the agitation, it was the primary duty of the Government to preserve law and order and to protect the life, property, honour and dignity of each one of its citizens.

The difficulty of the provincial Government was that it was almost impossible to limit and control the 'effects' of a movement, without administering a check to its 'causes'. Both in the sphere of political action, and in the sphere of preventive administrative action followed as a part of a national polity, the only authority competent to move in the matter was the Central Government. Despite provincial Governments insistence, the Central Government could not decide on timely action.

Within the narrow limits of maintaining day to day law and order in the province, the Provincial Government according to its lights, did the very best in its power, and was appreciably successful from March 1951 to February 1953. Events of March 1953 require special analysis (See Part IV of the statement).

2. The responsibility for the disturbances.

It is almost impossible to bring home precise responsibility to individual persons. A movement of such vast proportions and capable of exercising such deep and sincerely felt influence over the whole mass of a population, cannot be dismissed as a stray conspiracy of political adventurers, or as an incident in the intrigues of rival factions. It has a profounder motivation and takes root from the very nature and circumstances of the country.

At the risk of considerable repetition I may summarise the factors, which in my view, share responsibility for the situation as it developed.

(i) Age-old anti-Ahmadi feelings of the generality of the Muslims. (Already discussed).

(ii) The short-sighted attitude of the Ahmadis themselves, who instead of mitigating their differences with the rest of the Muslims, paraded and emphasised them. (Already discussed).

(iii) The vague religious basis of the national ideology of Pakistan. If it had been given precision, as the Qaid-i-Azam intended, it might have shown a path of hope, faith and steady progress to the nation. Left nebulous, but stressed in and out of season, it gave

strength to Mullaism and plausibility to the Mullas ways of dealing with political principles (Already discussed).

(iv) A measure of responsibility for the movement and the disturbances, must fall on the Ahrar leaders who were the actual instigators, organisers and agitators of the movement. I cannot question their religious conviction, but neither can they escape from the charge of exploiting an explosive situation for political purposes. The decision to embark on civil disobedience was of their own choosing. The consequences of such an action at such a time and in such an atmosphere cannot have been absent from their minds. It is possible that if they had been able to lead the actual civil disobedience movement themselves, they might have succeeded in checking its more violent and chaotic manifestations, because while a non-violent disciplined movement of such proportions would have certainly succeeded beyond doubt, a violent chaotic movement is almost sure to be suppressed. But whatever the personal responsibility of individual members, they must all have been aware of the general nature of the possible consequences.

The general body of the Ulems who shared in the agitation, share to that extent the responsibility for its results.

After the actual outbreak of the disturbances, responsibility for most of the acts of actual violence, must fall on the malcontents, professional miscreants and similar elements which abound in our cities. They are a product of our economic and social circumstances, experienced and equipped since the days of partition in all the arts of evil, and always

ready and in anxious wait for all opportunities of loot and violence.

(v) The extent and violence of the disturbances cannot be understood in their proper perspective unless the general conditions then prevailing in the country are kept in constant view. Deepest discontent existed in all sections of society. The rapid deterioration in the economic conditions and the failure in food supply had affected every one. In national problems - Kashmir, Junagadh, relations with India - humiliation had been piled upon humiliation. The handling of the constitutional problems, the delay in defining the future shape of the Government, complaints with regard to the administration had alienated educated and thinking men. There was no confidence in the leadership of the country, and no efforts were being made to revive or justify such a confidence.

In these circumstances there was hardly a single person in the country who felt a real urge to defend or justify the leadership. Criticism poured from all sides, there was general frustration and demoralisation in every quarter.

As early as April 1952, I brought these conditions to the notice of the Central Leadership. (Appendices Nos. 2 & 3). Subsequently I emphasised it on all occasions, particularly whenever I had the honour to meet the Governor-General who had a real understanding of the situation.

In such an atmosphere, any popular agitation was likely to put a match to all the gathered storm and all the accumulated

discontents in the hearts of the people. That is why when the movement came, it found no resistance, no break-waters of popular sympathy with the Government, and swept every one, for one cause or the other, into a common opposition.

(vi) A very large measure of contributory responsibility falls upon the leadership of the Central Government. No leadership has the right to exist which at a crucial moment fails to give a distinct lead to the people. It does not matter whether the lead is followed or not; but the very essence of leadership lies in the giving of the lead.

The problems presented by the movement were directly the concern of the Central Government and could be decided upon by no one else. The Central leadership failed to tackle them. They temporised, negotiated, and made concessions at a time when they should have spoken with a clear voice. This policy immobilised the powerful political party in their control, and the provincial governments, which could not act without their guidance and direction. When they finally took a decision both the time and the circumstances of the fight were determined by their opponents.

I do not wish to minimise the extent and enthusiasm of the public support behind the movement, but I am certain that if a similar challenge had been presented to the Qaid-i-Azam, or even later to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan it would have been met adequately and in time, and not with bullets but with the support and consent of the masses of the people.

Circumstances leading to the imposition of Martial Law.

A. Course of actual Disturbances and steps taken to meet them.

Faced with the clear challenge of imminent direct action, the Central Government, decided, in the early hours of the morning of the 27th, to take full coercive action against the organisers of the agitation. This was the first definite decision ever arrived at by Government in connection with the movement. Consequent action was taken in Karachi during the next few hours.

The first official intimation of the decisions taken at the Karachi conference were received by the Punjab Government on the return of Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatha and the Punjab officials during the course of the afternoon of the 27th. (Please refer to Mr. Chatha's Note Appendix No. 55). In accordance with the Central instructions, immediate precautionary and coercive action was taken. Orders were issued for the arrest of all the leaders of the movement, whose lists had already been prepared. The arrests were effected between the night of the 27th and 28th. Action was taken against the prominent press organs of the agitation. Detailed instructions were issued to the district authorities directing them to localise the movement and prevent its wider spread and flow, alerting them to vigilance, and instructing them to take the fullest and adequate measures to check and crush the agitation. These instructions were, officially communicated to all concerned, and remained the basis of Government policy throughout the course of the movement. They were amplified and further stressed from time to time, but no official instructions in mitigation or at variance with them were ever issued at any subsequent date.

I may summarise the main reactions of the Punjab Government to the movement at this stage.

1. We were conscious of the wide extent that the movement was likely to taken, and of the very great and genuine enthusiasm of the people behind it. This view was conveyed to the Central Government from time to time so that any unrealistic complacency may be avoided. Yet it must be confessed that the actual magnitude, enthusiasm and passion, later displayed by the movement, took me and I think almost everybody else by surprise. The C.I.D. reports in the past months had given a fairly accurate estimate of the growing anti-Ahmadi feeling in the province, and of the effect that constant unchallenged propaganda had on the views of the people. But there was nothing to arouse a precise suspicion of the deep reach of the agitation, of the extent to which the common people as well as most of the subordinate Government functionaries were prepared to go in support of it, and of the extremely efficient organisation displayed by the agitators, during the rapid course of the movement.

2. We had no illusions whatsoever that once an uncompromising attitude was adopted against the agitation, the main flare-up would take place in the Punjab, and the Punjab alone. The general level of religious and political consciousness in the province, the past traditions of the people, and the almost exclusive concentration of the main body of both the Ahmadis and the anti-Ahmadis in the Punjab, made this conclusion obvious. We had always given this aspect prominent mention in our deliberations with the Central Government. From the moment of the start of the movement, the Punjab Government consciously shouldered its full brunt.

3. Handling of the actual situation during the first four days was based on the following policy. The attempt was to arrest all the active leaders, to gag all propaganda in its favour, to expose the evil motives and grave dangers of the movement, so as to leave the movement without effective leadership, and to divert the sympathy of the people away from it. We were anxious not to alienate or exasperate the main body of the citizens, as experience of other movements showed that indiscriminate repression, and casting of too wide a net is very often likely to provoke. It was anticipated that without the leaders and a clear direction, and without the precision of day to day objectives against the Government, the enthusiasm of the people would gradually work and tire itself out.

B. Course of Events February 27th to March 2nd.

During the first three days the movement remained mainly peaceful and within control, but there were the clearest indications of the mounting enthusiasm of the people behind it - both in Lahore and the districts. The main slogan of the agitation was to secure the release of the arrested leaders, and since many of the leaders had been directly arrested by the Punjab Government, the force of the movement was now turned against the Provincial Government. It was argued that although the demands were the concern of the Central Government and any effort to win their acceptance should be directed against it, the Punjab Government by taking the step of arresting the leaders had stepped in to become the first enemy of the movement.

The agitation expressed itself in the form of general slogan-shouting, public meetings throughout the land, huge processions, which would only disperse, if large number of agitators voluntarily offering themselves for arrest were taken into custody.

It soon became apparent that almost the whole of the province was ablaze with enthusiasm. District reports showed that there was hardly a city, town or substantial village, which was not affected. In Lahore the number and audience of and participants in public meetings and processions increased beyond precedent. During the first few days of the movement, a general march towards Lahore was initiated by the agitators all over the province. Volunteers and supporters poured into the city from all sides, and it was only after some time that local handling in the districts could administer a check to this tendency.

A remarkable feature of the agitation which distinguished it from all previous agitations in the Punjab or elsewhere in the Indian sub-continent was soon apparent. In all previous agitations or disturbances, whether they were of a national, a communal or a parochial nature, only a section of the population had been affected. Large number of people remained apathetic, while there was always a substantial active element within the people which was hostile to it and sided with the Government. This was true of the Congress agitations, opposed by the Muslims, of the Muslim League movements, opposed by a section of Muslims themselves and the entirely of non-Muslims, of traders agitation in which only a few were affected, etc. and patently true of all communal riots and disturbances. But the present agitation in the Punjab encountered no threat of opposition within the people themselves. The homogeneity of the population, the general, uniformity of ideological tone and emotional emphasis, brought forth a common expression of solidarity, which whatever its value for a noble cause, proved almost fatal during a fit of mass madness.

By the end, it became apparent that the policy with respect to the agitation will have to be changed. It was not a question of countering a particular method of civil disobedience, or of preventing the commission of an illegal act in a particular place. The question was to control a frenzy which had the whole mass of the people in its grip. The arrest of top leaders had proved of no real effect, because the enthusiasm of the people was creating new leaders, new organisers and new methods of organisation in almost every city and town.

The decision was taken to come to grips with the movement in all its popular force. Instructions for suppressing the movement by all methods were issued to the Districts. In Lahore section 144 was ordered to be imposed, banning all meetings and processions (2nd of March). This step was taken after watching a day of ceaseless public meetings and processions. The largest of these terminated with the arrest of Akhtar Ali Khan near the Charing Cross, Lahore, where the entire police force including top-most officials like Home Secretary, Inspector General, Police Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore, Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore, Deputy Commissioner, Lahore were completely surrounded and isolated by the mob and I was later told that if the mob had become violent, they would have all been cut to pieces. (A word may be mentioned about the arrest of M. Akhtar Ali Khan. I had originally ordered his arrest on the 27th of February, but when he was taken to the Lahore Fort he offered an unconditional written apology to the Inspector-General of Police, disassociating himself entirely from the movement.

On his own initiative the Inspector-General of Police did not effect his arrest, and communicated the position to me on the morning of the 28th, in the presence of H.E. the Governor-General and P.E. the Governor of the

Punjab. We agreed to watch him further. On the 1st March, when orders for the banning of his paper the 'Zamindar' were issued, I again suggested his arrest, because I was told that he had been forcibly brought back to Lahore from his village by some leaders of the agitation. Later that evening I received a phone call from the Prime Minister from Karachi suggesting that in view of the prospect of M. Akhtar Ali Khan's father the much respected veteran politician Maulana Zafar Ali Khan being provoked into active participation in the agitation, we may more carefully consider the question of M. Akhtar Ali Khan's immediate arrest. I conveyed this conversation to the Inspector-General of Police and Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, and asked them to use their own discretion and judgement. M. Akhtar Ali Khan was not arrested that night. Next day he was forcibly compelled by the agitators to lead a procession and court arrest). After the dispersal of the Charing Cross procession, the law and order officers of the Punjab Government held a meeting with me. Orders were issued for the imposition of section 144. It was also decided to call in the Army, as a stand-by, to remain in readiness for further eventualities. In general an all-out offensive against the movement was decided upon.

From the night of the 2nd I was in almost hourly touch with all the relevant top officials and holding constant consultations with them. It remained my practice, however, to issue orders only through the Home Secretary, so that overlapping and confusion should be avoided. When the situation deteriorated further, my entire cabinet remained in continuous presence at the Government House from the 4th of March onwards.

C. Event of 3rd of March.

As a result of the imposition of section 144 there was an apparent lull in Lahore on the 3rd of March. For the first time since the 27th, there were no public meetings and no processions were taken out. It appeared possible that the determination of Government to meet the situation by all methods may succeed in having a salutary effect on the agitators.

On that day the movement in Lahore found concentration in the mosques; and in particular, the Wazir Khan Mosque began to emerge as the main centre and directing ground of the agitation. It also appeared that Abdul Sattar Niazi had worked himself into the leadership of the movement. My own reports, mainly derived from my public contacts, showed that the organisers of the movement, now concentrated in the Wazir Khan mosque, were not quite clear as to what step they should take next and were holding constant deliberations to decide upon a clear course of future action. In these circumstances, our general policy was to vigilantly watch the situation, but not to do anything to provoke public resistance or popular anger particularly in respect to action in mosques at a time when there was a possibility that the lull may herald a general show-down in the movement.

The Military had been called as a stand-by and they had taken positions in the Jinnah Gardens. It was also decided that they should patrol the city, for effect.

Later in the day two developments took place.

1. Reports were received from Nazir Khan Mosque in the evening that Abdus Sattar Niazi was whipping up very large audience into a mad religious frenzy. Later that night

I held consultations with Home Secretary and suggested that Abdus Sattar Niazi should be arrested even from the precincts of the mosque. This decision was confirmed on the morning of the 4th, when warrants for his arrest were issued, but in the situation as it later developed, the Police found it impossible to execute the order in the mosque. ✓

2. A sudden deterioration took place in the situation at Sialkot, when the civil authorities had to resort to firing. I kept in constant touch with Sialkot and directed that firmest measures should be taken. The Military was promptly called, and acting in excellent cooperation with the Civil authorities, and under their direction, were able to control an extremely difficult and chaotic situation between the 3rd and the 4th. On the civil side, I directed that the two heads of divisional administration viz the Commissioner Lahore and Deputy Inspector General of Police Lahore Range should proceed immediately to Sialkot, which they did by the 4th. This had the effect of bringing further confidence in the district administration and was helpful in a prompt handling of the situation.

False and exaggerated reports of the Sialkot happenings aggravated popular emotion in Lahore and elsewhere. Generally by the 3rd evening, the situation in the province was disturbed, while serious developments appeared imminent in the main centres like Gujranwala, Lyallpur, Rawalpindi, Sargodha, etc. I gave directions to the Commissioner, Rawalpindi, who was then also acting as Rehabilitation Commissioner General to proceed immediately to his division and remain at his post throughout, which, I may say, he did with excellent subsequent results. Similarly Deputy Commissioner Rawalpindi, who was then at Lahore

spending his joining time, was immediately dispatched to Rawalpindi to take up his post.

D. Event of March 4th.

In my view, March 4th turned out to be a crucial day in the agitation. It witnessed a general decisive deterioration in the situation, which can only be partly attributed to the fabricated reports pouring in from Sialkot. While throughout the day, in Lahore, there was no uncontrollable outbreak, and in a technical way the situation was generally in control, there could be no doubt of the high pitch to which mob frenzy, excitement and enthusiasm had mounted. Constant, innumerable, processions paraded the streets and Section 144 was frequently violated. On many occasions and with varying intensity, the Police had to resort to lathi charges. Reports, often exaggerated, of Police action, coupled with rumours of blasphemous conduct of the officers, even to the extent of the desecration of the Holy Book, circled the city, exacerbating feeling and intensifying indignation.

Throughout the day, the attitude and orders of the Government were to handle the situation firmly and without softness. The Military had already been called and was patrolling the city. As the situation, however, worsened during the course of the day, the Military suddenly and without notice to the civil authorities, stopped patrolling. It was reported that this was done at the orders of the General Officer Commanding. I have never quite understood the reasons for this action. Later developments on the 5th and 6th bring this incident into prominence as an indication of a certain confusion with respect to the role of the Military, in the minds of the Civil and Military authorities.

On the 4th there were indications, which later assumed the gravest proportions, of the sympathy of

a very large majority of subordinate Government servants with the agitation. This was expressed by a palpable sullenness and tendency to irresponsible talk in the offices.

At 6-30 p.m. news reached me that Syed Firdaus Shah Deputy Superintendent of Police City had been murdered in the Wazir Khan Mosque, where he had gone to rescue some Police constables who were reported to be trapped by the agitators (Annexure No. 40 report in 'Dawn' 5-3-1953). We all took a very grave view of this development, as it indicated a decisive change in the nature of the agitation and the methods of the agitators. I believe the Deputy Commissioner Lahore was so perturbed and so seriously disturbed by the course of the developments during the day, that he was in favour of handing over the situation to the Military there and then. The Home Secretary, the Inspector General of Police and the General Officer Commanding in joint consultation decided against such a hasty step and did not consider it to be warranted by the circumstances. (Please refer to statement of Inspector General of Police).

After 6-30 p.m. the situation in Lahore deteriorated sharply. Masses of people were out in the streets of the city shouting and parading in the most violent excitement. Frequent mobs were formed in an effort to storm individual police stations. I was personally in direct touch by phone with most police stations, and on some occasions even delivered their messages for assistance to the Kotwali. Later in the evening the first shooting by the police took place. The situation only became quiet by midnight, less by the operation of the Police than through the natural action of night.

I kept the Central Government informed of the developments and personally gave Khwaja Nazimuddin a resume of the happenings, within a few minutes of the first shots to be fired in Lahore. I had earlier expressed my anxiety at the situation of Hon'ble Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani and had suggested that a Ministerial representative of the Central Government should come to Lahore to see things for himself and help and guide us in the general handling of the events.

At about midnight I called the main officials concerned of the Punjab Government including Home Secretary, Inspector General of Police, Deputy Commissioner and Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore to my house to give me their authoritative impression of the situation, and of the steps they proposed to take the next morning. We carefully went over each aspect of the measures to be adopted, but I was not fully satisfied. So at 2-00 a.m. I sent a message requesting the presence of General Officer Commanding who arrived with his full staff shortly after 3-0 a.m. The Police and Military Officers held a long discussion in my presence. It was decided that the Military should be called in, in force, to camp at numerous strategic positions in the city, to patrol extensively and generally to come out in assistance of the Civil authorities. The Military was to be in position soon after dawn. The meeting ended at about 4-30 a.m. E.

EVENTS OF MARCH 5TH

From early morning there were signs of mass upsurge. In Lahore crowds began collecting earlier than usual, and as a result of what was considered to be the 'provocation' of the night before, their mood was more aggressive. Reports from most of the districts indicated distinct deterioration: in Sialkot the situation was in check, but news from places like Lyallpur, Gujranwala, Sargodha and Rawalpindi caused grave anxiety. It was

also clear that in some form or the other the agitation had gathered momentum in every part of the province.

In the morning a Cabinet meeting was held at Government House which was attended by the General Officer Commanding and Provincial Officers. It was decided to use the strongest measures against the agitation. Curfew order was extended. The Police was directed to take very strong action and to use any amount of force to bring the situation in check. The Military was to support the Police force and if the Police could not cope with conditions in a particular sector, the situation was to be handed over to the Army. If even these measures failed to achieve results, the Military was to be called upon to take over completely. Other decisions to keep up and support the morale of the Police were taken (Please refer to Ministry & Officials - morning Cabinet meeting of 5th in the Government House).

The Police and the Military were out in operation in the city in force. Throughout the day there was considerable shooting. From the Government House we could hear intermittent bursts of firing at frequent intervals. Reports from Police and public sources indicated innumerable incidents in innumerable localities.

At this stage a strange situation developed. The Police officers complained that the Military was not playing its full part, and that while public resentment was at fever heat against the Police; the Military was being fraternised with and garlanded. When I spoke to the General Officer Commanding his general attitude was that the most suitable course is to hand over the complete situation to the Army, because effective results required unified control. Throughout the 5th of March his insistence on this point was consistent. The Military had been called out in aid of the civil

power, and it was surely its duty to use all methods to bring the situation in control. This was the normal procedure that had been followed everywhere and had already during the very disturbances yielded excellent results in Sialkot.

The firings of the 5th did not have the desired effect of controlling or intimidating the aroused populace. On the other hand the Police Officers conveyed to me a distinct feeling of mounting resentment and hardening resistance. The effect on the Police force in action was already beginning to be felt. They were tiring. They were also bewildered at the resistance, and I gained the impression that in time they may begin to shy at too much firing.

By the afternoon, subordinate Government functionaries in various offices and particularly the Civil Secretariat had struck work in sympathy with the agitators, demanding immediate cessation of the firing. Their attitude towards their highest superiors, like Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Inspector General of Police was insolent and aggressive. ✓

Many public elements in the town, who were sympathetic to the Muslim League and the Government contacted me frequently during the day. They were of the unanimous opinion that the city was in violent emotional turmoil and that they were certain that mere repression would yield no results but merely aggravate the situation.

In pursuance of a decision taken at the Cabinet meeting held in the morning, public leaders of all parties were collected in a Conference at Government House at 4-00 p-m-- Amongst those who attended were ✓

Maulana Maudoodi, Nawab Mamdot, Mian Iftikharuddin, Sirdar Shauket Hayat Khan, Mirza Ibrahim, Khalifa Shujauddin, and some 30 other leaders . . . No result was achieved at this Conference. The speeches made were mostly of a 'propaganda' and 'party' value and did not lead to a conclusion. The one unanimous point urged was the mounting rage of the people at the firing which was described as 'indiscriminate' and 'without precedent'. Maulana Maudoodi suggested immediate compromise with the agitation through the opening of high level negotiations. His views were later conveyed to the Centre by H.E. the Governor, but the Prime Minister directed that at the movement no further action was to be taken on Maulana Maudoodi's Proposal.

Earlier in the day, H.E. the Governor had accepted the offer of Mr. Amir-ud-Din Kidwai, Advocate, who wished to parley with Abdus Sattar Niazi in Wazir Khan's Mosque in an effort to bring the agitators to reason. As far as I am aware nothing came out of this attempt of a well-intentioned patriot. Reports on the other hand suggested that something bordering on mass hysteria prevailed in Wazir Khan mosque, where Abdus Sattar Niazi had practically set up a shadow Government which was convinced of its imminent victory. No police officer dared to go anywhere near the strategically well situated and easily defended mosque.

After the abortive Peace Conference, the Cabinet, the General Officer Commanding and the Punjab Officials met in a meeting presided over by H.E. the Governor. The general situation was reviewed. No decisions over and above the decisions of the morning meeting were taken, which remained to serve as the order of the day. H.E. suggested that keeping public emotion in view it would be prudent not to resort to unnecessary firing at the commission of technical offences like stray violation of the curfew. This certainly did not mean any change in the policy of the Govt. to use firmest measures against the movement.

The situation late on the night of the 5th may be summed up as follows:-

1. The tempo of the movement, and the resistance of the people had mounted beyond all expectation and precedent. Two views were expressed by the Police Officers. The first was that a lot of firing had taken place during the day and it was likely to have a sobering effect in the morning. The second was that the strain on the Police was tremendous and that it would be imprudent to ignore the limitations of a civil force which is affected by the same emotions as the general people, and is responsible to the same milieu.

2. Every measure which was open to a civil administration had been taken to deal with the situation firmly. The Police and the army were in operation in force. More firing had taken place in a day than probably ever before in the history of Lahore in the course of a popular agitation.

F. EVENTS OF MARCH 6TH

The 6th of March was a Friday. In view of the religious significance of the day and of the opportunity that the congregation of Friday prayers provided to the agitators, we were conscious that the agitation may touch new heights.

From the early morning reports were as bad as could be. Consequently I rang up the Hon'ble Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani at Karachi and expressed to him the gravest anxiety at the situation. I requested him to come to Lahore by the fastest available plane and reach before Jumma prayers, because I feared that the most serious development may take place, and I wanted an authoritative representative of the Centre to be on the spot to see things for himself and help us with his advice. He said that there was an important Central

Cabinet meeting in the morning to which I replied that nothing could be more urgent than the situation in Lahore. He promised to do his best and assured me that he would inform me later.

all the Ministers and all the provincial officers, as and when they could come back from their duties, were in session at Government House throughout. The previous day it had been decided to invite a number of the prominent citizens of Lahore to a conference at Government House, therefore a fair section of them were present at the Government House all through the forenoon.

The situation took a rapid and dramatic turn. Mobs were reported to have collected in thousands in every part of the city, displaying a very bellicose mood and a fanatical non-chalance to repressive handling. By 2-00 a.m. all Lahore appeared to be one seething mass of agitation. Soon after, reports of mob violence began to pour in. ahmadia and non-ahmadia were attacked and killed, shops were burnt and looted, many fires were visible from the Government House. Police Stations, Post Offices and public buses were burnt. (annexture No. 42. Press Note in 'Dewan'). Revolt spread rapidly amongst almost the entire ranks of the civil functionaries. The Civil Secretariat employees marched out in sympathy with the agitators and took on the aspect of rioters. They were soon joined by the workers of almost all the other offices. Water-supply, electricity and later telephone connections were consciously cut out as a challenge to the Government. All civic and civilised life came to a standstill in the city. The situation was absolutely out of control.

It soon became apparent that the Police force was no longer in a position to handle the situation. All that they could do was to defend themselves as best as they could and hold on to their positions. Their morale was naturally at a low ebb. The possibility could not be ignored that many of

3

them could break under the strain and may even throw arms before the agitators. Few could remain unaffected by the white heat of frenzied conviction displayed by a whole town gone mad. The commanders of the Military seemed now quite definite in their attitude. Short of complete handing over of the situation to them and the imposition of martial law, they did not feel that they could give any effective help. Unless the entire control was in their hands, they did not wish to embroil themselves in the situation.

The Punjab Government, faced a tremendous crisis. The city of Lahore seemed on the point of blowing up. It was then that with full deliberation and in complete accord with my colleagues I decided to make a last effort to save the city. I looked at the situation in this way. The only method of coercive handling of the situation now open to us was the imposition of Martial Law. We had earlier received a signal from the Central Ministry of the Interior, issued on the 8th of March, advising that Martial Law was not to be imposed unless it became absolutely unavoidable. Martial Law is in any case the extremist possible step. It was almost unprecedented in a free country and had never been resorted to in the Indian sub-continent since 1947. It had dread memories for the people of the Punjab, who had not even to this day forgotten the happenings of 1919. In all minds it was exclusively associated with the most repressive forms of foreign domination. We were dealing with our own people, gone and it is true, but still the free citizens of a free country, and with whom the destinies of each one of us were for ever bound. It is by the Military authorities without much loss of life but at the time it was by no means clear that in the white heat of religious frenzy displayed by the people even the declaration of Martial Law would succeed in controlling the situation without widespread carnage and enormous loss of life. It was, therefore, my conviction that a last effort must be made to take the frenzy out of the people, to create a situation in which time could be gained, passions cooled, and a chance given to the re-establishment of sanity. The common man had fallen into the hands of the

fanatic and the miscreant. We could not fight the common man. Before embarking on irrevocable repression, we must try to detach him from the anti-social elements.

The advice and indication given to me by the topmost relevant officers was unanimous. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore was particularly brought to me by the Inspector General of Police to express the view that a mere repressive handling of the situation was out of the question, and that a political handling which would appease the worked-up emotions of the people was absolutely and immediately necessary. He was even prepared to resign on this issue. The Home Secretary and the Inspector General of Police cast no doubt of this reading of the situation. They confirmed the fact that matters were completely out of hand, that the Police was tired and bewildered and breaking under the strain, and that a political handling may be the only method of saving the town. All my colleagues were of the same view.

In the presence of H.E. the Governor and with his approval I rang up Khawaja Nazimuddin at Karachi. The Lahore exchange was in turmoil, and only the personal courage of the single operator on duty was able to get me the connection. I gave a full resume of the situation to the Prime Minister, which was confirmed by H.E. the Governor in each detail. I conveyed to him the opinion of my colleagues and my officers, and I told him that I intended to issue a public statement appealing to the public to stop the agitation, as the Punjab Government was prepared to place the popular demands before the Central Government with their support. The Prime Minister who was then in a Cabinet meeting, did not make any comments of his own, but asked me to wait on the line. He did not forbid me to issue the statement. I waited for a considerable time, until the line was cut off at the Exchange.

I again consulted my colleagues and the officers (Inspector General of Police, Home Secretary, Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore) who were present in H.E.'s office. I also took the advice of a large number of

the prominent citizens of Lahore who were also in the building. They were unanimously of the opinion that a public statement on the lines indicated above should be issued. It was under these circumstances that the statement of March 6th was issued (Annexure No. 43. Press Note No.257. Text of statement appended.)

Efforts were made to give immediate publicity to the statement. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore volunteered to distribute it to the collected mob personally. The Governor directed the Home Secretary to read the statement out on the phone (the phone connection was restored soon after) to Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din, the Speaker of the Punjab Assembly, who had earlier volunteered to contact the agitators in Wazir Khan Mosque. He was requested by H.E. to go personally to Wazir Khan Mosque with the statement in an effort to bring reason to the agitators.

The statement was issued at about 11-00 a.m. For nearly two hours we carefully watched the reactions of the public. It soon became apparent that the situation was not likely to improve. The madness had gone too far. Evil elements and miscreants dominated the situation. Religious hysteria demanded nothing short of martyrdom. The leadership in Wazir Khan Mosque was too precariously perched on fanatical popular enthusiasm to take the risk of a sane handling of the crisis. The mission of Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din & others failed to have any effect.

By 12-30 there was no change in the situation. The last effort to avoid Martial Law had failed. Consequently the Punjab Government asked the Military (through the General Officer Commanding) to take full control of the situation in accordance with the decision of the Cabinet meeting of the 5th March (Already referred to above which had envisaged such an ultimate eventuality. At about the same time, the Central Government issued instructions to

the General Officer Commanding, directing him to impose Martial Law. Soon after the city was under Martial Law.

G. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION.

I would like to submit certain aspects of the situation as it developed on the 6th of March to further analysis.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 6TH.

(1) One or two preliminary points about this statement must be clarified.

(a) It is obvious that the issue of the statement of March 6th, was not one of the circumstances leading to Martial Law. It was a last effort to avoid Martial Law. When it did not succeed, Martial Law was proclaimed. It is obvious that even if the statement had not been issued, Martial Law would not in any case have been imposed more than an hour or so earlier.

(b) The issue of the statement did not in any way affect the adequacy of the measures taken by the Punjab Government to meet the situation. Upto 11-0 a.m. on the morning of the 6th the firmest and most forthright measures available to a civil administration had been employed by the Government against the agitation. It was their patent failure which induced an attempt to pursue a political line of approach, when that also failed, within no more than two hours, resort was had to the extremist measures of all. It would not be correct to argue that the situation deteriorated because between the issue of the statement and the imposition of Martial Law, there was a possible letting off in Police action. It is clear that the situation was already out of control at 11-0 a.m. If the police had been considered capable of a further intensification of effort, that effort would have been made before the occasion for the statement could have arisen.

The real relevance of the statement of March 6th is for an assessment of the political correctness or incorrectness of my decision. I may say forthwith that I take the fullest responsibility for it. The decision was arrived at in full consultation and with the complete approval of all advice then available to me, but the decision was mine. In the situation as it developed it was my duty to make a last effort to avoid Martial Law and to bring a measure of sanity to the people.

What I did was not unprecedented. Not very long ago, in Dacca, faced with a much less serious situation, the issue of national language, which was of no less significance for the unity and solidarity of Pakistan than Sectarian fanaticism the Government of East Bengal had placated the people of East Bengal by immediate surrender to their demands. More recently in Karachi a couple of shots and a Minister's burnt car had induced complete acceptance of the demands of the students and the removal of a Minister from his post. Moreover my statement did not commit the Central Government to a reversal of policy. It was merely an effort to calm a particular situation, leaving the final initiative in the hands where it had lain for the past two years.

It is true, that my effort failed. More drastic expedients became inevitable. But I would have acted wrongly if I had taken the last step without having tried every other possible step.

2. We have sometimes been criticised for not having used the military resources available to us to the full, before the imposition of Martial Law. I think this criticism is based on a wrong knowledge of facts. The civil authorities in the Punjab did every thing possible to secure the full assistance of the Army. From the 2nd March onwards we were in full liaison with the Military.

Patrolling commenced on the 3rd, the Army took position on the 4th, the Military forces were called in full support of the Civil authorities on the 5th. The Governor and my Cabinet were in the closest touch throughout with the General Officer Commanding. No important executive decisions concerned with the handling of the situation were taken without his consultation. On the other hand it became apparent after the 4th March that the Military authorities in Lahore had their own views on what coming out in aid of civil power precisely meant. Again and again they suggested complete handing over of the situation to them. While asking for their fullest assistance on the 5th and 6th, the civil authorities, very naturally, could not consider a complete handing over till it became inevitable in the circumstances. That the Punjab Government took the correct view is proved by the instructions issued by the Central Government on 5th of March which urged all possible avoidance of Martial Law.

I may mention that except to the extent which I have indicated in connection with Lahore, no difficulty ever arose in the relationships between the civil and Military authorities throughout the handling of the situation in the Punjab. I have already given the example of Sialkot. The same complete cooperation and understanding marked the relationship in later handling at Rawalpindi, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Sheikhupura and Gujranwala, etc.

3. The inadequacy of the measures taken by the civil authorities in handling the situation in Lahore is sometimes sought to be proved by pointing out to the comparative ease with which the Military brought the situation in control almost immediately after the 6th of March. The comparison is altogether unfair.

(a) The total number of the Police force in operation Lahore was under 1500. When the Military finally

took over complete control of the city, there were ten times that number of Army personnel in occupation of the city.

(b) It is true that a rifle and a sten gun would be equally effective in the hands of a Police Constable i.e. 'Spahi' as it is in the hands of a 'Fauji'. But it is not a question of a rifle or a sten-gun. It is a question of how many rifles and how many sten- guns. Moreover the mere rambling of tanks, the mounting of guns, the modern paraphernalia of a whole army in occupation can have a crushing psychological effect on a civil population.

.....

Section 1.Handling of the situation in the Punjab after March 6th.

1. The situation in Lahore remained quiet after the imposition of Martial Law, Lahore was in any case no longer the responsibility of the Provincial Government.

In the 16 districts and other cities and towns of the Punjab the movement continued. Everywhere it was firmly dealt with by the Punjab Government. Full and adequate measures were taken in each instance, and within 7 to 10 days the situation was uniformly brought under control.

Details of the exact measures taken could be made available by the Home Secretary and the Inspector General Police. I would confine myself to giving two examples. The situation in Lyallpur deteriorated after the 6th, I was in constant touch with the Deputy Commissioner and repeatedly gave him the most definite instructions to use the firmest measures in handling the situation. He was promptly given Military aid and supported in his orders to open fire on unruly mobs. He was also directed to deal strongly with all political elements, irrespective of their party affiliations. The situation in Lyallpur was soon under control. Gujranwala was dealt with similarly, but I had an impression that full force was not being used there. I repeatedly urged the district authorities to employ firmer measures such as large scale arrests and firm administration of section 144 etc. Not satisfied with this, I dispatched the Deputy Inspector General of Police Lahore Range and the Commissioner Lahore on two or three occasions to report to me on the

Gujranwala situation, and it was only when they expressed their full satisfaction at the adequacy of the measures being taken, that I dropped my insistence on more drastic methods.

The position in all the 16 districts was closely watched. Whenever the least cause for anxiety developed in any region, the fullest measures including help of Military, strengthening of the Police force, dispatch of senior officers were resorted to. As is well-known firing had to be ordered in various places like Lyallpur, Rawalpindi, Okara, etc. In other places where the Deputy Commissioners reported that the situation was in hand, they were required to be vigilant. They were supported in permitting the agitation to die down gradually and without unnecessary provocation. I may categorically state that in no case were any official instructions issued or personal suggestions given which mitigated the circular of 2nd March - enjoining Deputy Commissioners to use all methods against the agitation.

The success with which the situation was handled is proved by the steady and satisfactory manner in which the agitation was controlled in every part of the province before my Ministry left office.

In the two or three days immediately following the 6th of March, conflicting reports were received, from the districts with respect to the effects of the statement of the 6th on the agitation. It was soon apparent, however, that in the leaderless shape which the movement now presented, too many people were interested in preserving the tension and too few knew how to calm the emotions which had been aroused. The one and only motive of the statement had been to make a last attempt to bring sanity and reason to the people. When it became obvious that the attempt had not

succeeded and that an immediate check had not been administered to the agitation, it had to be made absolutely clear that law and order will be restored by all possible methods before any political question could be considered. This was the reason why I issued the statement of 10th March (Appendix No. 45). It was a realistic acceptance of the fact that the effort made on the 6th of March to control the movement had failed and that no other political effort could be considered until and unless complete peace and order had been established in the province. The Punjab Ministry acted on this principle and we were able to achieve it in practice before it resigned from office towards the end of March. (The account that I have given of the purpose of the two statements may be confirmed by a perusal of the speeches which I made in March - one to the Muslim League Assembly Party on the 15th of March 1953 (Appendix No. 47) and the other during the course of the Budget Session in the Punjab Assembly on the 20th of March 1953 (Appendix No. 49 pages 12 to 22)).

Section II.

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE DURING THE AGITATION.

I have previously given an account of the attitude of the Muslim League organisation to the Anti-Ahmadi movement, till resort was made to civil disobedience in February 1953. No clear guidance or directive on policy was ever available to the members of the Muslim League before. Despite their personal feelings and views, I was able, however, during this period to prevent their vast majority from taking any active part in the movement - particularly after August 1952.

The situation however completely changed on 27th of February, 1953. The question of a directive ceased to be relevant. It was now clear that anybody who took part in an illegal movement, whatever its objectives, was guilty of violating the discipline of the Muslim League, and could not remain a member of the organisation. Soon after the outbreak of the movement I exhorted the Muslim Leaguers on the 1st April 1952 to keep entirely aloof from any action which was likely to give any support to the agitation. (Please see Appendix No. One, directive to League Workers and Appendix No.13 - Daultana's appeal). In the first meeting of the organisation to be held during the movement (viz Muslim League Working Committee meeting on 11th March and Muslim League Assembly Party meeting on 15th March) (Appendices No.46 & 47 respectively), I made it clear that any person who took any part in the movement could not remain a member of the organisation.

The position about those Muslim Leaguers who violated this discipline was clear. Administratively they were to be dealt with like anybody else. Organisationally they were to be subjected to disciplinary investigation.

There was no doubt about the instructions given to the Administration. Every Muslim Leaguer who broke the law was to be punished. Consequently during the agitation a number of high-ranking Muslim Leaguers were arrested, including four M.L.As., the Presidents of the Lyallpur and Gujranwala City Leagues and some Councillors of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League. Investigation would show that a much larger number of the rank and file of Muslim Leaguers was similarly dealt with. On all references made to me by officials, I asked them to use special severity against delinquent Muslim Leaguers. I also remember that on one

occasion in the presence of the Inspector General of Police. H.E. the Governor and myself studied the names of Muslim Leaguers who had been mentioned in connection with the agitation in the districts situation reports, and we directed that suitable action should be taken against each one of them.

It must however be confessed that a number of Muslim Leaguers took part in the agitation. Two circumstances would explain this. (1) The consistent confusion of policy which had been imposed on Muslim Leaguers, found them in a bewildered state when the movement actually broke out. The mass of the people were with the agitation. The strength of an individual Muslim Leaguer depended largely on the popular estimation in which he was held. It required real courage and integrity to make a clear-cut adjustment at this last moment and in this many failed. (2) The tremendous surge of the agitation is not realised today. Many were swept by it against their will. In every town the first target of the agitators were the Muslim Leaguers. They were often forced out of their houses, their lives threatened, their honour attacked, and by main coercion compelled to lead processions and take part in the agitation. I have personal knowledge that this happened in Sialkot, Gujranwala & Lyallpur. Such circumstances must mitigate our judgement of what was too often an involuntary conduct.

I resigned from the Chief Ministership of the Punjab on 23rd March 1953 and I conveyed to the President of the Pakistan Muslim League that I did not propose to take any further interest in my office of the Provincial League Presidentship. Consequently the question of organisational action against delinquents was not ripe during my period of office and must no doubt be exercising the attention of the present

Provincial Muslim League leadership.

A word must be added about the complaint sometimes made by certain officers that they were hampered in dealing with the agitation because they were supposed to obey local Muslim League dignitaries in all things; and in many places these very persons led the movement. This is an absolutely lame excuse. No where and at no time had the officials been directed by me or my Government to obey Muslim Leaguers. In fact it had always been made clear to them that they should in no case brook unfair interference from any quarter in the just administration of their duties. This was the burden of most of my public speeches from April 1951 onwards.

It is true that I had suggested informal periodic consultations between Deputy Commissioners and member of what were called the District Mufed-i-Ama Committees of the Muslim League. Official record will show that the purpose of these meetings was purely consultative, in which non-political general matters of public interest alone were to be considered. Deputy Commissioners were specially asked to see that no interference of any sort was countenanced. In their official reports which are doubtless preserved in Government records, the Deputy Commissioners invariably praised the help they were receiving from these meetings.

The position of the agitation was in any case absolutely clear. It was an illegal movement. Anybody who took part in it was violating the law. He had to be dealt with accordingly whether he was a Muslim Leaguer or not. I would challenge any officer to prove a single case in which on a reference from him, he was asked to mete special treatment to members of the Muslim League. It is incomprehensible to me how any officer can have the simplicity to take guidance from the action of an ordinary citizen as against the clear and unequivocal orders of the Government.

ADEQUACY OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE CIVIL
AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO DEAL
WITH THE DISTURBANCES.

In Part II of my statement I have dealt with at length with all the measures that the Punjab Government could and did take, in their circumstances, to prevent and control the agitation.

Parts IV and V of my statement describe in detail the day to day measures taken by the Punjab Government to deal with the developing exigencies of the civil disobedience movement. These latter may be summarised in the form of a few conclusions.

1. From the very start of the movement, the Government took all adequate measures, possible in the circumstances. It faithfully carried out the instructions of the Central Government. All the prominent leaders of the movement were arrested, all press organs supporting the agitation were suppressed. Clear instructions were sent to district officers directing them to use the strongest measures in dealing with the situation. As occasion arose, all forms of force were used in every part of the province. Firing took place in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot and Gujranwala. Lathi charges were a usual feature in all the seriously affected districts. It may be safely asserted that such a volume of force has never been employed anywhere in the Indian sub-continent since 1947, and very seldom equalled even in the period of British rule.

As the strain on the police force increased prompt provisions were made to encourage their morale by providing better amenities and giving

awards and compensations. Efforts were also made to supplement the police force available by making requests for immediate police reinforcement from neighbouring provinces which could not, however, be spared.

2. The instructions to the officers concerned were clear and distinct, from beginning to end. At no stage and on no occasion were they directed to substitute softer methods. Whenever district reports indicated that the situation was in control the officers were requested to remain vigilant and to continue a policy which had, hitherto, yielded satisfactory results. Whenever the situation showed signs of deterioration, superior officers were sent to assist and supervise, Military assistance was requisitioned, Police force was strengthened, and close touch kept with the developments. The examples of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lyallpur, Rawalpindi, Sargodha, Sheikhupura and Montgomery may be cited in support.

3. In handling of a particular situation primary reliance had, of course, to be placed on the tact, vigilance and ability of the local officers. By and large district officers concerned succeeded in controlling an extremely difficult situation with the minimum of damage and delay.

4. The situation may be summed up by saying that while the measures taken by the civil authorities succeeded in achieving satisfactory results in the 16 districts of the Punjab, they did not succeed in the city of Lahore.

The failure in Lahore was due to the unprecedented development of the situation. Any

civil power has limited resources for meeting a mass upsurge. It can only use a certain measure of force. The man-power it relies upon has close contacts with the general public and can stand up only to a certain degree of strain.

Within these limitations, and according to its lights, the Punjab Government did its best. It asked the Police to use all possible force. It called in the Army to come in aid of the Civil power. It dealt with hundreds of incidents on each day for a week. At the end, it used the last expedient of a political approach before it had to submit to the unprecedented decision of Martial Law.

It is wrong to say that at any stage the Government directed a letting-off in Police firing in Lahore. No such order was ever given, and I would request an examination of Government record to prove that point. The letting-off in firing between 11-00 a.m. and 1-00 p.m. on the morning of the 6th was determined by the state of the Police and the impracticability of further action, and not by any other deliberate policy. In any case a space of two hours before the employment of severest measures, has no real bearing on the situation.

5. The statement of March 6th was not a measure which brought about a deterioration in the situation and cannot therefore be called 'an inadequate handling' of the situation. It was a last attempt to deal with the situation in a way which would keep

it within the purview of civil power. When it failed, no hesitancy was displayed in handing over the situation to the Military.

In the districts, whatever the effect of the statement, it was not the cause of any deterioration which can be attributed to it. The instructions sent to the districts on the 6th of March were to exercise vigilance and to ask for all necessary assistance to meet any situation. Such necessary assistance was, in all cases, provided by the Provincial Government. In any case, ultimate results showed that, as far as the districts were concerned, the measures adopted by the Provincial Government proved fully effective.

6. On or about the 10th of March, H.B. the Governor conveyed a formal assurance to me on behalf of the Central Government that they were fully satisfied with my handling of the situation. In his last official conversation with me on the 22nd of March, Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din said that as far as the events of 6th March were concerned, he was convinced that no one could have acted differently from me.

7. It is my opinion that in dealing with the March disturbances, the Punjab Government fully performed its duties. I am not aware of a single step

which could have been taken by a civil power and which we failed to take. That the situation developed with a rapidity and an intensity which was beyond all precedents, was due to circumstances entirely outside our control and which had deep roots in our past history.

Sd/-

(MUMTAZ MUHAMMAD DAULTANA)

Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana,
Ex-Chief Minister, Punjab.

Verification.

Verified that the facts narrated in my above statement are correct to my knowledge and belief.

Verified to-day, the 17th of August, 1953, at Murree.

Sd/-

(MUMTAZ MUHAMMAD DAULTANA)

Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana,
Ex-Chief Minister, Punjab.